A causal model of linkages among strategy, structure, and performance using directed acyclic graphs: A manufacturing subset of Fortune 500 industrials 1990-1998 by Chong, Hogun
    
A CAUSAL MODEL OF LINKAGES AMONG STRATEGY, STRUCTURE,  
 
AND PERFORMANCE USING DIRECTED ACYCLIC GRAPHS: 
 
A MANUFACTURING SUBSET OF THE FORTUNE 500  
 
INDUSTRIALS 1990 - 1998 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
by 
 
HOGUN CHONG 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of 
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics 
    
A CAUSAL MODEL OF LINKAGES AMONG STRATEGY, STRUCTURE,  
 
AND PERFORMANCE USING DIRECTED ACYCLIC GRAPHS:  
 
A MANUFACTURING SUBSET OF THE FORTUNE 500  
 
INDUSTRIALS 1990 – 1998 
 
 
A Dissertation 
 
by 
 
HOGUN CHONG 
 
 
Submitted to Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
 for the degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
 
David A. Bessler 
(Chair of Committee) 
 
 
 
  Mary Zey 
(Member) 
H. Alan Love 
(Member) 
 
 
 
  David J. Leatham 
(Member) 
Albert A. Cannella, Jr. 
(Member) 
  A. Gene Nelson 
(Head of Department) 
 
 
May 2003 
 
Major Subject: Agricultural Economics
   iii  
ABSTRACT 
 
 
A Causal Model of Linkages among Strategy, Structure and Performance  
using Directed Acyclic Graphs: A Manufacturing Subset of  
the Fortune 500 Industrials 1990 - 1998. (May 2003) 
Hogun Chong, B.Econ., Seoul National University; 
M.Econ., Seoul National University; 
M.S., University of Arkansas 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David Bessler 
 
 
 This research explored the causal relationships among strategies, corporate 
structure, and performance of the largest U.S. non-financial firms using Directed 
Acyclic Graphs (DAGs). Corporate strategies and structure have been analyzed as 
major variables to influence corporate performance in management and organizational 
studies. However, their causal relationships in terms of which variables are leaders and 
followers, as well as the choices of variables to configure them, are controversial. 
Finding of causal relationships among strategic variables, structural variables, and 
corporate performance is beneficial to researchers as well as corporate mangers. It 
provides guidance to researchers how to build a model in order to measure influences 
from one variable to the other, lowering the risk of drawing spurious conclusions. It also 
provides managers with information about how important variables would change when  
certain strategic decisions are made. Literatures from agency theory, transactional cost 
   iv  
economics, and traditional strategic management perspective are used to suggest 
variables essential to analyze corporate performance. This study includes size and 
multi-organizational ownership hierarchy as variables to configure corporate structure. 
The variables to configure corporate strategies are unrelated and related diversification, 
ownership by institutional investors, debt, investment in R&D, and investment in 
advertisement. 
The study finds that most of the variables classified as corporate strategy and 
corporate structure variables are either direct or indirect causes of corporate accounting 
performance. Generally, results supports the relational model such that corporate 
structure leads corporate strategy, and corporate strategy leads corporate performance. 
Ownership hierarchy structure, unrelated diversification, advertising expenses, and 
R&D intensity have direct causal influences on corporate accounting performance. Size 
and related diversification affected corporate accounting performance indirectly, both 
through ownership hierarchy structure. Theoretical causal relationships from agency 
theory are less supported than those from transaction cost economics and traditional 
strategic management perspective. Further this study suggests that, in general, good 
corporate performance in 1990s was mainly achieved by internal expansion through 
investment in R&D and advertisement, rather than external expansion of firms through 
unrelated diversification, related diversification, and expansion of ownership hierarchy. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The strategy, structure and performance trilogy has been a major topic of 
research in management and organizational analysis. Corporate strategies and structure 
have been analyzed as major variables to influence corporate performance in 
management and organizational studies. However, their causal relationships in terms of 
which variables are leaders and followers, as well as the choices of variables to 
configure them, are controversial. Finding of causal relationships among strategic 
variables, structural variables, and corporate performance is beneficial to researchers as 
well as corporate mangers. It provides guidance to researchers how to build a model in 
order to measure influences from one variable to the other, lowering the risk of drawing 
spurious conclusions. It also provides managers with information about how important 
variables would change when strategic decisions are made. Chandler (1962) defined 
structure as the design of an organization through which the enterprise is administrated. 
Kenneth (1971) defined strategy as the result of a balanced consideration of a firm’s 
skills and resources, the opportunities extant in the economic environment, and the 
personal desire of management. According to Chandler (1962), Rumelt (1974), and 
others, an analysis of strategy and performance without structure or an analysis of 
structure and performance without strategy can show only a piece of the whole 
 
This dissertation follows the format of the Academy of Management Journal.
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fundamental relationship. In his seminal work, Strategy and Structure (1962), Chandler 
posited and found, through historical case studies of the most successful industrial 
organizations, that strategy leads to the performance only through diversified structure, 
the multidivisional form.  
However, there are a group of  researchers who suggested structure leads 
strategy. Structure sets the agenda for top manages in making strategic decisions 
(Hammond, 1990). Pitts (1980) maintained that structure institutionalizes strategy and 
thereby provides the premises for strategic decision making. Chamberlain (1968)  
suggested that structure and historical actions constrain firms strategies such that they 
constrain the set of alternatives from which strategies may be chosen. Contemporary 
managerial theorists have found the structure → strategy → performance relationship is 
more important (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel,1993). Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson 
(1992: 501) summarized the point: 
A significant amount of research on diversification has ignored the importance 
of implementation on the strategy-performance relationship. By ignoring the 
effects of organizational characteristics, many prior studies may have produced 
erroneous or, at best, incomplete results.  
 
With respect to the corporate diversification strategy, Hoskisson and Hitt (1990: 462) 
note, there still is no commonly accepted theoretical framework that explains the 
antecedents of the diversification strategy and the relationship between diversification 
and firm outcomes such as performance.  Indeed despite the large volume of research to 
answer the question of whether diversification leads to improved corporate 
performance, these empirical studies have often resulted in contradictory findings 
(Perry, 1998). A group of strategic management research posits and finds direct 
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relationships between strategies and performance regardless of structure (Amit & 
Livnat, 1988; Bettis, 1981). To my knowledge analysis showing a direct causal 
relationship between structure and performance in the absence of strategy has not been 
published. To illustrate possible causal flows, four dominant relational models of 
performance, strategy, and structure are presented in Figure 1.1. In fact all present 
theories on the trilogy of strategy, structure, and performance have been generated by 
deductive logic from an assumed set of conditions. The true causal relationships among 
these three components have not been analyzed.  Causal relationship are gotten clouded. 
For example, performance may increase some strategies and appeared to 
strategies causing performance. Under some conditions the cost of advertising may not 
predict performance, but rather performance of the corporation may predict the 
resources managers can spend on advertising. Likewise, we can question the 
relationship between the strategy of diversification and performance. Perhaps low 
corporate performance requires change in diversification strategy. 
If the predictor variable is performance rather than diversification, then this may 
result in contradictory findings among existing studies. The true causal relationships can 
only be defined by the empirical relationships within the corporations. Therefore I do 
not posit the causal links between types of strategy, structure and performance variables 
but use directed acyclic graphs to reveal the empirical causal relationship. I do posit 
expected relationships form the finding of current organizational analysis. 
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Figure 1.1 
Dominant Relational Models of Performance, Strategy, Structure 
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 The significance of my research is that I: (1) investigate which causal ordering 
of corporate strategy, corporate structure, and corporate performance is supported by 
directed acyclic graphs, Such a graph, if it exists, can provide guidance to researchers 
on modeling corporate performance, (2) conduct a systematic analysis among variables 
measuring corporate strategy, corporate structure, and corporate performance and thus 
provide insight on how they are causally related, (3) escape the limitation of previous 
studies based on cross-sectional data analysis by using longitudinal data analysis and 
thus provide more stable model, and (4) introduce and measure a structural variable in 
which one organization controls large numbers of legally separated organizations at 
several levels, the multi-organizational ownership hierarchy. 
Questions related to which variables should be included in the model and how to 
measure them have been addressed in previous studies. Theoretical and empirical 
studies in the area are used to specify an initial set of related variables and general 
hypotheses. The explicit relationships among them will be sorted out using directed 
acyclic graphs (DAGs), a new method from artificial intelligence and computer science. 
DAGs offer insights on problems of model specification when dealing with 
observational data (non-experimental data). The fundamental concept in this method is 
the notion of d-separation, which formalizes conditional independence among variables 
(Pearl, 2000). 
Keats and Hitt (1988) used LISREL (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1984) and Hoskisson, 
Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel (1993) used EQS (Bentler, 1989) generate a structural 
equation model (SEM).  But derived Structural Equation Models (SEMs) from EQS or 
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LISREL do not reveal the direction of causal relationships (Hoyle, 1995; Spirtes, 
Glymour, & Scheines, 2000).  “SEM cannot test directionality in relationships. The 
directions of arrows in a structural equation model represent the researcher’s hypotheses 
of causality within a system”(Stoelting, 2001). “Regardless of approach, SEM cannot 
itself draw causal arrows in models or resolve causal ambiguities. Theoretical insight 
and judgment by the researcher is still of utmost importance” (Garson, 2002). 
In this study, DAGs are applied for the construction and interpretation of the 
causal structure of business corporations’ performance. With prior theoretical 
background and the directed acyclic graph, causal flows among performance and other 
variables are revealed. I use TETRAD II (Scheines, Sprites, Glymour & Meek, 1994) 
with directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) on longitudinal data to find a structural model that 
does not require prior hypotheses of causal flow or time ordering; that is, no 
hypothetical restrictions are required.  
Though Keats and Hitt (1988) measured environment, organizational 
characteristics, and performance in a different time frame, they performed their analysis 
on cross sectional data. Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel (1993) conducted only 
cross sectional analysis using a two-year average. As Ramanujam and Varadarajan 
(1989) noted, time dependency of diversification and performance relation is a factor 
that should be considered in analysis. The few studies that examined the time dependent 
nature of diversification and performance found that the relationship varies over time 
(Perry, 1998). The effect of strategies on performance is not stable over time and this 
instability may create spurious results or no relationship at all, when time effects are not 
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considered. In order to estimate a causal structural model to capture the effect of 
diversification, multi-organizational ownership hierarchy, and other characteristics on 
corporate performance appropriately, longitudinal data are collected, that consist of a 
large number of cross-sectional units from 1990 to 1998, in this study.  
The importance of including a sufficient number of relevant variables in the 
causal analysis cannot be over-emphasized. In order to provide an unbiased model of 
causal relations from observational data, it is important to have causally sufficient set of 
variables (Spirtes et al., 2000). When we have a causally sufficient set of variables, 
there are no omitted common causes for any two or more of the variables included in 
the study. There have been few studies undertaken to uncover the causal relationship 
among strategic variables, structural variables, and performance in corporate 
management. Two studies, which did focus on these relationships, are: Keats and Hitt 
(1988) and Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel (1993). However, these studies failed 
to include investment in research & development (R&D) as well as in advertisement 
and effects of ownership hierarchy in forming a causally sufficient set of variables. Both 
studies acknowledged and measured R&D as an important factor. Hoskisson, Hitt, 
Johnson, and Moesel wrote, “All except R&D, were used in the main structural 
equation model. Inclusion of R&D severely restricted the sample size” (1993: 225). The 
form of ownership hierarchy was analyzed by Zey and Swenson (1999), but they did 
not include R&D and advertising in the study. As an effort to lower the risk of not 
constructing a causally sufficient set, a new structure variable, multi-organizational 
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ownership hierarchy, along with R&D expense and advertising expense are added in the 
study. 
 
Objective of the Study 
The objectives of this dissertation are: 
1. To define through the directed acyclic graphs the causal ordering of various 
strategy, structure and performance variables.   
2. To construct a causal model of corporate performance measured as return on 
assets. 
3. To define the relationship between the effect of multi-organizational 
ownership hierarchy and corporate performance.       
4. To investigate existing predominant theories of corporate performance and 
their support by way of empirical analysis. 
  
Organization of the Dissertation 
This study is organized into six chapters. The second chapter explores theories 
and previous studies in the areas of management and organizational study to determine 
a set of variables that constitute a causally sufficient set. The third chapter introduces 
the directed graph approach. The fourth chapter covers the data, measurement, and 
discusses the framework of the research method. The fifth chapter covers the DAG 
results, subsequent model estimation, out-of-sample forecasts and evaluations on 
alternative models.  Discussion and conclusions complete the study. 
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CHAPTER II 
 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The requirement of a sufficient data set to reveal causality does not give the 
researcher the permission to add just any variables that are collectable or used in the 
previous studies. The theoretical background of each strategy, structure, and 
performance variable and its relevancy to the study are carefully reviewed. Based on 
historical management theory, transaction cost economics, and agency theory, variables 
from major empirical studies are chosen and measured to represent strategy, structure, 
and performance. Only variables found in previous empirical researches to predict 
corporate performance are included in the model. 
Three types of variables are examined: (1) performance measured as return on 
assets (ROA); (2) structure1 measured as size (SIZE) and multi-organizational 
ownership hierarchy (MOOH); (3) strategy measured as related diversification (RD), 
unrelated diversification (UD), debt (DEBT), institutional investors (INST), research 
and development intensity (R&D), and advertising intensity (ADV). This chapter will 
examine past relevant studies to define the relationships among ROA and structural and 
strategy variables. Figure 2.1 gives detailed dominant relational models with variables 
in each category.    
                                                 
1 Structure in my study refers to corporate structure and is not to be confused with traditional market 
structure from industrial organization (IO) economics (Bettis, 1981). 
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Figure 2.1 
Dominant Relational Models of Performance, Strategy, Structure and Selected 
Variablesa 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Panel A.  Hypothesized Causal Flow I 
 
 
 
 
  
          
 
 
Panel B.  Hypothesized Causal Flow II 
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Panel D.  Hypothesized Causal Flow IV 
a Definitions of variables are provided at Table 4.1. 
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Performance 
Though the measurement of performance is an essential prerequisite for research 
in corporate management, no consensus exists among organizational analysts and 
management researchers on how to define and measure corporate performance (Perry, 
1998). The conceptualization and measurement of performance is not an easy task and 
depends on how a study depicts the objective of the firm (Keats & Hitt, 1988). My 
study implicitly assumes that the primary objective of the firm is to maximize its 
profits. Accounting based indices of returns2 can be used to assess the firm profitability 
and thus performance. Accounting performance has been considered as an important 
outcome variable by both practitioners and strategy analysts (Bettis, 1981; Rumelt, 
1974). Along with accounting performance, researches in corporate management have 
used market performance that is based on movement of stock price.  However, 
accounting profit more directly reflects the impact of corporate strategy on a firm’s 
performance than stock price, because stock price include expectation about future 
profits and are greatly affected by social factors (Grant, Jammine, & Thomas, 1988). 
This study analyzes the accounting performance of the large U.S. firms mainly 
from manufacturing industries. The accounting performance of a firm can be measured 
by return on asset (ROA) or return on equity (ROE). The ROA approach is appropriate  
when analyzing large corporations that can establish and maintain rigorous leverage 
policies and that have efficient access to the national markets for debt and equity 
                                                 
2 To distinguish the financial performance measure with the market performance measure using changes 
in stock price, several previous studies named the financial performance measure as the accounting 
performance measure (Hoskisson et al, 1993; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1994).  
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capital. In contrast, the ROE approach is applicable for smaller, private firms whose 
leverage fluctuate over time and that lack access to the national markets for debt and 
equity (Barry et al., 1995: 286).  
ROA can be viewed as a measure of management’s efficiency in utilizing all the 
assets under its control, regardless of source of financing. By definition, it reflects 
firm’s relative efficiency in the utilization of its assets (Bettis & Hall, 1982). In research 
on the effects of strategy and structure on performance, ROA is appropriate because 
these relationships rely on whether efficiency increased or decreased (Habib & Victor, 
1991). Hence, ROA is chosen as a primary measure of corporate performance. 
 
Structure 
 In this study, size and multi-organizational ownership hierarchy are included as 
structural measures of large U.S. industrial corporations. Structure can be defined as the 
design of organization through which the corporation is administrated (Chandler, 1962). 
Then structure follows strategy. Meanwhile, there is a perspective that structure 
influences strategy (Hammond, 1990). In this view, structure sets the agenda for top 
managers to make strategic decisions, since critical information and decision making 
capabilities in larger corporation are dispersed throughout the corporation rather than 
concentrated in top mangers.  
 
Size 
Either as a mediator variable or main effect variable, size has been treated as a 
major predictor of corporate performance. Rationale for increasing corporation size is 
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generally explained in terms of market share, and economies of scale and scope. Some 
theorists posit size as the major predictor of certain structural configurations (Pugh et al, 
1969; Blau, 1970). Others focus on the relationship between size and strategy, structure 
and performance. Size is correlated with both related and unrelated diversification 
strategy, and structure in a way that mediates strategy and structure (Grinyer & Yasai-
Ardekani, 1981). Keats and Hitt (1988) include size as the mediator between the 
strategy and structure in their causal model on corporate performance. They view size 
having indirect effect on performance via diversification and structure. Armor and 
Teece (1978) include size in the model to control for the possible effects of economies 
(or diseconomies) of scale based on the multidivisional form hypothesis (Williamson, 
1975), i.e., because size is positively related to an increase in multidivisional form. 
 Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989: 318) state “…economic reasoning suggests 
that across all diversification strategies, the managers of large firms in concentrated 
industries should be more willing to invest in research and development than the 
managers of small firms….” Thus they posit that diversification does not affect the 
relationship between size and R&D. They suggest that size and R&D intensity are 
positively related in a way that larger firm invest more on R&D. A larger firm might be 
better able to internalize the benefits of R&D investments by enjoying larger economies 
of scale in R&D.  Size is included in my study in order to measure not only the possible 
direct and indirect effects on ROA; but also the effects of size on strategic and structural 
variables as a mediator, which may result in increase or decrease corporate 
performance.  
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Hypothesis 1: Size does not have a direct effect on corporate performance, 
rather size has either an indirect effect or a mediator effect on performance. 
 
SIZE           MOOH            ROA 
             Strategies 
 
Multi-Organizational Ownership Hierarchy3 
The importance of governance structure in corporate management is well known 
(Chandler, 1962; Rumelt, 1986; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel,  
1994). Studies of corporate governance generally focus on either the multidivisional 
form (M-form) hypothesis4 (Williamson, 1975) or on the vertical financial ownership as 
a proxy for vertical integration strategy (Mahoney, 1992), both focus on divisions5, i.e., 
product lines.  
The empirical existence of divisions as the organizing concept of product line in 
corporations has all but disappeared by 19986 (Zey & Swenson, 1999). In this study, I 
analyze corporate governance structure using subsidiaries7 rather than divisions. This 
allows me to analyze governance structure to a greater extent, since multiple levels of 
governance structure are measurable. Counting levels of subsidiaries facilitates a 
                                                 
3 The explanations on theories are borrowed from Economics of Strategy written by Besanko, Dranove,  
and Shanley (2000). 
4 The organization and operation of the large enterprise along the lines of the M-form favors pursuit and 
least-cost behavior more nearly associated with the neoclassical profit maximization hypothesis than does 
the functional organizational alternative (Williamson, 1975:150). 
5 Separate operating units of a corporation. A division may have its own officers, but it is not 
incorporated nor does it issue stock (America’s Corporate Families, Dun & Bradstreet).  
6 In my study, in 1998 among 190 parent companies in the sample, 100 companies have no division, 66 
companies have less than 5 divisions, and 11 companies have more than 10 divisions. 
7 Subsidiary is one whose controlling interest (over 50%) is held by another company (America’s 
Corporate Families, Dun & Bradstreet). 
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general study of multiple corporations within a parent or executive office, rather than 
divisions in a single corporation. Subsidiary links indicates not only product flows but 
also capital flows8. As will be explained later in this section, the trend in organizing 
governance structure in US manufacturing firms in 1980s and 1990s was from the M-
form to the multisubsidiary form with one or no division (Zey, 1996; see also the work 
of Prechel, Boies, & Woods, 1999). However, few studies analyze the governance 
structure in terms of subsidiaries. To distinguish the current study from previous studies 
on multidivisional form and  vertical financial ownership, it is helpful to introduce a 
new descriptive concept of the multi-organizational ownership hierarchy (MOOH). 
MOOH differs from M-form on several significant characteristics. MOOH is a parent 
corporate holding multiple corporate subsidiaries, which own other subsidiaries. 
Therefore, MOOH is measured by counting levels of subsidiary ownership. In contrast, 
the M-form consists of a single corporate entity. The M-form must own all stock 
regardless of divisions. The M-form organization must be fully capitalized, whereas 
organization as a MOOH, allows the parent corporation to own only a fraction of its 
holdings. The divisions are part of the corporate entity, whereas subsidiaries are legally 
separate organizations. MOOH controls and governs multiple levels of subsidiaries 
whereas M-form does not. 
MOOH can be defined as a vertical ownership structure, in which a central 
office of holding company controls, multiple, legally separated organizations arranged 
in a hierarchy. Each hierarchical level below the first level owns additional multiple 
                                                 
8 Subsidiaries can be production units, selling units, or diversified profit generating units.  
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levels. Thus MOOH measures the levels of subsidiaries held by the Fortune 500 parent 
companies. 
For the remaining part of this chapter, theories that depict the importance of 
vertical financial ownership as governance structure are reviewed and distinctions are 
made between divisions and subsidiaries. This review is necessary because most 
theories explain vertical financial ownership and multiple-organizational ownership 
hierarchy, but do not cover the distinction between divisions and subsidiaries. 
Each firm’s structure is unique. How a firm ought to organize as it grows in size 
and complexity is the question addressed in the study of organizational form (Armor & 
Teece, 1978). Researchers following Chandler (1962) and Rumelt (1974) have 
attempted to categorize corporate structures into five groups based on the major options 
open to top management and their potential impact on the general management task. An 
additional task adopted by this group of researchers is to test the hypothesis that 
multidivisional form is superior to other organizational forms. Based on transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1979; 1981), researches have studied a continuum of 
governance structures that include spot markets, various contracts, franchising, joint 
ventures, and hierarchy (vertical financial ownership). Asset specificity, with the cost of 
production, agency costs, and cost of transactions are major criteria for determining 
which governance structure is preferred to another in a given environment. An increase 
of profit can be achieved if the chosen governing structure allows for efficiency of 
operations within the organization. Formally, the optimal organizational form is 
determined based on interplay of technical efficiency and agency efficiency. Agency 
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efficiency concerns the efficiency of the exchange process, whereas technical efficiency 
concerns the efficiency of the production process (Williamson, 1991). Technical 
efficiency is closely related to the cost of production that relies on economies of scope 
and economies of scale in Chandler’s managerial model (Chandler, 1990). Technical 
efficiency, narrowly defined, represents the degree to which a firm produces as much as 
it can from a given combination of inputs. Technical efficiency, more broadly defined, 
represents whether the firm is using the least-cost production process. In contrast 
agency efficiency refers to the extent to which the exchange of goods and services in 
the vertical chain has been organized to minimize agency and transaction costs. Agency 
costs are the costs associated with slack effort and with the administrative controls to 
deter slack effort. Mangers are “slacking” when they do not act in the best interest of 
their firm. Transaction costs include the costs of monitoring, information, 
administrative time, and negotiations that accompany transactions (Williamson, 1991).  
An alternative theory initiated from Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and 
Moore (1990), explains the desirability of vertical financial ownership as a governance 
structure in a different way. Their theory focuses on the importance of asset ownership 
and control. This theory begins with the critical observation that the resolution of the 
make-or-buy decision determines ownership rights. It is based on the common belief 
that most contracts are incomplete in a way that individuals cannot contemplate all 
possible contingencies. If contracts were complete, it would not matter who owned the 
assets. The owner of an asset may grant another party the right to use it, but the owner 
retains all rights of control that are not explicitly stipulated in the contract. These are 
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known as residual rights of control. When ownership is transferred along with the 
residual rights, the legal rights of the selling party are fundamentally changed. By 
emphasizing asset ownership, the theory identifies an important dimension of vertical 
financial ownership. It also suggests that there is a degree of vertical financial 
ownership depending on the extent to which one party or the other controls specialized 
assets, i.e., asset specificity  (Williamson, 1975).  
Vertical financial ownership is one governance structure through which vertical 
integration may be achieved. The core concept of vertical financial ownership is the 
elimination of contractual or market exchanges and the substitution of internal transfers 
within the boundaries of the firm (Williamson, 1975; Mahoney, 1992). 
Considering the number of studies of vertical financial ownership9 over the last 
few decades, it is surprising that MOOH, that measures the ownership of subsidiaries, 
have barely been addressed, especially with respect to causal analysis of corporate 
performance. A corporate can own a lower level entity in the form of a division or a 
subsidiary. The distinction between division and subsidiary is substantial and it is well 
summarized by Zey (1998)10. It suggests that there are advantages for the parent 
company when it owns it’s lower level in the form of subsidiary, rather than as a 
division. This is reflected in the empirical data from the 1980s and 1990s that will be 
                                                 
9 Long list of the studies on vertical financial ownership is provided from Mahoney (1992). 
10  Zey offers a more detailed description. Here I note the most important. A division is part of the parent 
company, while a subsidiary is a separate entity legally only owned by a parent company (at least more 
than 50%).  Subsidiaries issuing their own stocks and bonds are embedded directly in the market in which 
they compete, while divisions do not issue stocks or bonds. Subsidiaries can have own lower levels, 
divisions don’t. Legal liability firewalls separate the parent company from its first level subsidiaries and 
each level thereafter reduces the parent company’s financial liability. This is not the case for divisions. 
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presented in Chapter V. To facilitate the understanding of how MOOH is organized, I 
present two parent corporations from 1998 data. Table 2.1 contains two 1998 
corporations as an example of ownership hierarchy. In both cases, the parent company, 
the lowest level subsidiary ,and subsidiaries between the parent company and the lowest 
level subsidiary are closely related in terms of primary SIC code11. Usually the highest 
level subsidiary, which is linked to the lowest level subsidiary in Table 2.1, is one of the 
major entities held by the parent corporation. Brown & Root Holding Inc., a second 
level subsidiary of Halliburton, owns 19 of 54 subsidiaries at third level. Occidental 
Petroleum Investment Co Inc., a first level subsidiary of Occidental Petroleum, owns 10 
of 14 subsidiaries at second level. Sales volume is not always lower for subsidiary in 
lower level in the ownership hierarchy. Often a lower level subsidiary has higher sales 
volume than the owning subsidiary above it in the ownership hierarchy.  
An ultimate parent company is required to own more than 50 percent of its first 
level subsidiary and 25 % of its second level subsidiary. Also a first level subsidiary is 
required to own more than 50 percent of the level below it and a second level subsidiary 
owns more than 50 percent of the third level subsidiaries it holds and so on. This 
implies that the financial relationship between an ultimate parent company and its first 
level subsidiary is stronger than the one between an ultimate parent company and its 
second level subsidiary. The control relationship between the parent company and lower 
                                                 
11 Relatedness among a parent companies and subsidiaries in terms of primary SIC code becomes less 
significant as a parent company has significant numbers of divisions. However, in 1998 among 190 
parent companies, only 11 of them have more than 10 divisions.   
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a  Source: America’s Corporate Families: the Billion Dollar Directory. 1998. Parsippany, NJ: Dun & 
Bradstreet Inc. 
b  SIC codes 1389 is oil and gas field services, 1629 is heavy construction, 8711 is engineering services, 
2812 is alkalies and chlorine manufacturing, 2869 is industrial organic chemicals, and 2865 is cyclic 
organic crudes and intermediates and organic dyes and pigments manufacturing.  
  
Table 2.1 
An Illustrative Example of Ownership Hierarchy Focusing on Lowest Level 
Subsidiarya 
 Number of 
subsidiaries 
Name of subsidiary SIC codesb Sales 
Halliburton Co (SIC: 1389, 1629, 8711) (Sales: 7.3 MMM) 
 
Level 1 1 Halliburton Delaware Inc. 
 
1629, 1611, 8711 NA 
  ↓   
Level 2 4 Brown & Root Holding Inc. 8711, 1629, 1541 3.3 MMM 
  ↓   
Level 3 54 Brown & Root Inc. 
 
1629, 8711, 1611 2.5 MMM 
  ↓   
Level 4 6 Brown & Root Technical 
Services Inc. 
8711 300 M 
  ↓   
Level 5 3 Global Drilling Services Inc 1629 77 M 
  ↓   
Level 6 1 Global Arabian Co for 
engineering & Construction 
Pro. 
1629 170 M 
     
Occidental Petroleum (SIC: 2812, 2869, 2865) (Sales: 10.5 MMM) 
 
Level 1 6 Occidental Petroleum 
Investment Co Inc. 
1311, 2812, 2869 4.4 MMM 
  ↓   
Level 2 14 Occidental Chemical Holding 
Corp. 
2869, 3089, 2873 4.3 MMM 
  ↓   
Level 3 14 OXY Chemical Corp 
 
2869, 2873, 2874 1.8 MMM 
  ↓   
Level 4 19 OXY C H Corp. 
 
2869,3089,2685 1.7 MMM 
  ↓   
Level 5 3 Occidental Chemical Corp. 2812, 2869, 2819  2.6 MMM 
  ↓   
Level 6 1 Interore Corp 5191 12.1 MM 
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level subsidiary weakens as the number of levels increases. Accordingly the top 
manager in the central office of the parent company may monitor or control fewer levels 
of subsidiaries to a greater extent. The possibility of less control from the top manager 
on lower subsidiaries may give the managers of lower level subsidiaries more potential 
to deviate from the ultimate parent company and pursue its own goals; behave 
opportunistically which means self-interest with guile (Williamson, 1975).  
It is a working hypothesis of this study that if an ultimate parent company makes 
its multi-organization ownership hierarchy deeper, it can generate more free capital that 
would otherwise be used in acquiring the holdings, i.e., in other words, it can control a 
defined magnitude of assets with smaller amount of capital. Possible advantages and 
disadvantages of the multi-organizational ownership hierarchy can offset each other to 
determine the optimal level of MOOH. The expansion of multi-organizational 
ownership hierarchy may be beneficial to the ultimate parent company until it reaches 
optimal level MOOH and then either less beneficial or harmful. This scenario can be 
tested by revealing the relation between performance and the level of ownership 
hierarchy. As ownership hierarchy structure becomes deeper, the capability of a parent 
firm to control its capital structure may become weaker. When control of capital 
structure passes through increasing level of hierarchy, the risk of loss of control 
increases with each additional level. 
 The importance of including multi-organizational ownership hierarchy in the 
study can be showed in a different way. Benefits of efficient strategies have been 
defined as synergy and financial economies (Hill, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992). Synergistic 
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economies are associated with related diversification (Teece, 1980; Willig, 1978). 
Financial economies are associated with unrelated diversification (Teece, 1982; 
Williamson, 1975). All these benefits are closely related with expansion of firms. A 
firm may expand both horizontally and vertically. Diversification, neither related or 
unrelated, can distinguish vertical and horizontal expansion. Multi-organizational 
ownership hierarchy is a measure that allows us to measure the expansion as a vertical 
ruler. As a firm grows in size and changes it’s organizational strategies including 
diversification, it may expand horizontally or vertically or in both directions. Multi-
organizational ownership hierarchy is included in the study as a structural variable to 
incorporate vertical financial ownership and to distinguish vertical expansion with 
horizontal expansion. 
Hypothesis 2: The proliferation of the ownership hierarchy is directly related to 
performance, because as the hierarchy is extended the executive officer loses 
control over lower level. Thus I expect proliferation of MOOH to reduce 
performance.  
 
Strategy 
 Related and unrelated diversification, ownership concentration by institutional 
investors, debt, research and development intensity, and advertising intensity are 
included in the study to measure strategy of the large U.S. industrial corporations. 
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Diversification 
Strategic management perspective. Corporate diversification has been a 
dominant research stream in the field of strategic management and industrial economics 
for the past thirty years. This is not surprising since one of major tasks of corporate 
mangers is to answer the question: What business should the firm be in? (Sambharya, 
2000). The volume of research on diversification indicates the importance and relevance 
of the topic (Perry, 1998). The increase in number of measures and techniques of firm 
diversification is an easily observed reflection of its importance (Sambharya, 2000).  
The relationship between diversification and firm performance has been 
analyzed from many perspectives. Major incentives for diversifying a firm into related 
businesses are economies of scale, synergies and economies of scope, and market power 
because they all increase ROA. Risk pooling, reduction of probability of bankruptcy, 
and economies of internal capital markets are the major incentives for diversifying into 
unrelated businesses (Perry, 1998; Hill & Hoskisson, 1987).   
Economies of scale refers to the decline of unit cost as the volume of production 
increases (Porter, 1985). The firm, by using its given resources more fully, is able to 
move down its average cost curve and thus enjoy an advantage over competing firms 
(Singh & Montgomery, 1987).  When the union of two entities brings more 
opportunities that are not available otherwise, the two entities can enjoy synergistic 
economies. Synergy or economy of scope can be realized from using common 
infrastructures, including resources that are more or less tangible such as marketing and 
R&D operations, production facilities, and distribution systems and intangible such as 
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brand names (Perry, 1998). Market power exists when market participants have the 
ability to influence price, quantity, and the nature of product in the market place 
(Shepherd, 1970). When a firm expands its business into related product areas, it may 
take existing technology, marketing, or specialized management that can help in 
developing competencies superior to those of the competition (Montgomery & Singh, 
1984).  
Risk pooling, reduction of probability of bankruptcy, and economies of internal 
capital market are ways of explaining potential benefits from unrelated diversification. 
As long as the earnings for two segments of businesses are not perfectly correlated, 
combining the two segments will reduce the variance of earnings for the organization. 
As earnings are stabilized through unrelated expansion, the probability of bankruptcy 
falls and the diversified company’s risk perceived by the lending institutions decreases 
(Bettis, 1983). Strategic management theory assumes that managers can actively 
intervene to lower corporate risk in a manner not available to shareholders. Using 
strategies to develop a competitive advantage, managers can reduce their company’s 
risk by reducing the volatility of earning relative to that of the economy as a whole 
(Porter, 1985). In contrast, financial theory is based on the premise of passive 
management such that cash flows can be combined but not altered by managers. Under 
the assumption of perfect capital markets, risk pooling through unrelated diversification 
cannot improve firm value since individual investor can duplicate this from portfolio 
investments (Levy & Sarnat, 1970).  
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Transaction cost economics perspective. Economies of internal capital 
markets from the transaction cost paradigm can explain the benefit of unrelated 
diversification (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Williamson, 1975). Unrelated diversification 
can overcome external capital market failure (Teece, 1982; Williamson, 1975). They 
suggest that an external governance mechanism often suffers from two limitations that 
constrain its ability to efficiently allocate capitals between firms, and to discipline the 
managers of firms. The first limitation is that shareholders, in circumstances where 
ownership and control are separated, experience information disadvantages in their 
relationship with firm divisional12 managers who allocate corporate capital. The second 
limitation is that shareholders experience control disadvantages in their relationships to 
manger when ownership and control are separated (Williamson, 1975). In contrast, an 
internal governance mechanism that has rich information, a strong performance 
monitoring system, and congruent reward and incentive schemes can overcome these 
limitations in the relationships with its divisions. In other words, using unrelated 
diversification, firms can achieve a more efficient allocation of capital resources 
between divisions by monitoring the divisions more effectively than the external capital 
market could if each division were an independent firm (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987).  
Agency theory perspective. Strategic management view of diversification has 
an implicit assumption that companies pursue diversification to maximize the value of 
the firm. Alternatively, agency theory proposes that diversification may be motivated by 
managerial efforts to make personal gains rather than maximize the value of the firm. 
                                                 
12 It includes divisions and subsidiaries. 
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There are two ways mangers can get benefit from diversification. First, firm size is 
highly correlated with diversification as well as with executive compensation (Tosi & 
Gomez-Mejia, 1989). Thus, diversification provides opportunities for managers to 
increase their compensation. Second, diversification can reduce managerial employment 
risks, such as job loss, loss of compensation, or loss of managerial reputation (Amihud 
& Lev, 1981). These risks are reduced with diversification because the firm becomes 
less vulnerable to the fluctuation of any one market, thereby limiting the influence from 
one market on corporate performance. Thus, diversification may be motivated by 
manager’s own value maximization instead of maximizing firm value. 
According to agency theory, there are internal governance mechanisms designed 
to control managerial discretion and incompetence. These include, but are not limited 
to, ownership structure, board of directors, and executive compensation schemes. When 
none of the internal governance devices are successful in controlling managerial 
discretion and incompetence, the company’s performance is likely to increasingly 
diverge from its maximum potential and accordingly the value of the firm will drop.  
Under this circumstance, external governances such as the market for corporate control 
can alleviate management discretion and makes managers align with shareholders.  
Given the potential conflict of interests between shareholders and managers over the 
optimal amount of diversification, the preference of mangers will likely prevail if the 
internal and external governance mechanisms fail. Alternatively, if management 
discretion is properly controlled, firm diversification will approach the optimum level 
that aligns with firm value maximization. The ownership of institutional investors is 
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included in the study as a proxy for internal governance mechanism. And debt is 
included as a proxy for external governance mechanism.  
Summary of diversification. The strategic management perspective suggests 
that both related and unrelated diversification makes corporations show better 
accounting performance. The benefits from related diversification are defined by 
economies of scale, economies of scope, and market power. The benefits from unrelated 
diversification are defined by risk pooling, reduction of probability of bankruptcy. The 
perspective from transaction cost economics explains a benefit of unrelated 
diversification using economies of internal capital markets.  Meanwhile, agency theory 
perspective suggests that diversified corporations can perform well only when top 
manager is monitored successfully either using internal or external monitoring 
mechanism. 
Hypothesis 3a: Related diversification has both direct effect and indirect effect 
via debt and institutional investors on corporate accounting performance.  
Hypothesis 3b: Unrelated diversification has both direct effect and indirect 
Effect via debt and institutional investors on corporate accounting performance.  
 
Institutional Investors 
 The ownership concentration by institutional investors (INST) is one of the 
major trends in stock ownership over the past several decades. Institutional holding of 
U.S. corporate shares have grown from 12 percent of all stocks in 1949 to over 50 
percent in many industries by the early 1990s (Mallette & Fowler, 1992). It has been 
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assumed that institutional investors snatched corporate control from the hands of 
managers in the last quarter of the 20th century (Useem, 1993;1996).  
Berle and Means (1932) first introduced the idea of  “separation of ownership 
from control” in large companies. They maintained that it is hard for shareholder to 
exercise tight control over managers, because there are many individual and 
institutional investors, who share ownership of companies and each of them holds only 
a small percentage of the total outstanding equity. Moreover, it is not an easy task, and 
is some period of U.S. history it was illegal for shareholders to form groups in order to 
enhance their collective influence on managers. Under a weak disciplinary device such 
as the capital market with high dispersion of ownership, corporate managers may have 
strong control of corporation. However, corporate managers often waste or steal 
resources by managing companies in such a way to serve their own interests, rather than 
to serve the interests of shareholders (owner).  
 On the other hand, concentration in the hands of a few shareholders or in a given 
types of institutional investor carries with it an incentive to closely monitor managers 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Institutional investors can provide governance when those 
with large ownership stakes are able to provide effective monitoring (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). Acting as continuous monitors, concentrated shareholders can play an 
important role in preventing managerial decision to deviate from the interests of 
shareholders (Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993). 
Researchers have found evidence to suggest that institutional investors support 
long-term managerial policies such as R&D expenditures (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 
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1991; Hill & Snell, 1988; Hill & Hansen, 1991) and new product development (David 
& Kochhar, 1996). There are several studies to support the view that the concentration 
of ownership by institutional investors is a constraining influence on diversification 
(Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hill & Snell, 1988; Hoskisson et al., 1994). Generally, prior 
studies have suggested a positive relationship between institutional investors and 
performance but did not reveal the causal relationship (Demsetz, 1983; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). There is a large empirical literature on the 
question of whether owner controlled or manager controlled companies performed 
better (Short, 1994). According to a survey conducted by Short (1994), a significant 
majority reported that owner controlled firms outperform manager controlled firms 
where the shareholdings are highly diversified. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) suggest that the concentration of ownership by institutional investors is expected 
to increase corporate accounting performance. Though I cannot disregard the possibility 
that higher accounting performance may attract institutional investors to invest.  
Hypothesis 4: The corporation with high concentration of institutional investor  
ownership will outperform the corporation with lower concentration. 
      
Debt 
From the viewpoint of agency theorists, high levels of debt associated with high 
interest payments act to discipline managers to align with the goal of shareholders. As 
debt level becomes higher, management has less discretion in the allocation of the free 
cash flow of a company. The financial pressure from debt forces management to invest 
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wisely and thus be more efficient, because possible bankruptcy from failing to satisfy 
debt obligation is a serious threat to managers not only in terms of the loss of their jobs 
and associated perquisites, but also in term of ruining its reputation (Jensen, 1986, 1988; 
Aghion, Dewatripont, & Rey, 1999). Thus agency theory posits that higher debt can 
increase corporate performance. 
Financial market pressure from debt burden is also associated with increased 
productivity growth. Financial market pressure along with product market competition 
and shareholder control makes the role in generating improved productivity 
performances in companies possible (Nickell, Nicolitsas, & Dryden, 1997). Agency 
theory suggests that higher debt level might lead to higher accounting performance 
through increased pressure on the corporate manager. The higher the level of debt a 
company holds, the better the accounting performance of the company. 
There is a possibility that research conducted in a different economic period may 
more strongly or weakly support agency theory, that is I would expect monitoring effect 
on managers of debt and institutional investors to be stronger in a period of recession. 
However, during the period of continuous economic growth in last seven years of 
1990s, I would expect monitoring of managers as agents of owners to be weaker than in 
a period of declining. 
Hypothesis 5: Financial pressure from high debt level will results in high 
return on assets.  
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R&D Intensity 
According to transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; 1979; 1981), a firm 
can generate rents only when it has built up specific assets that distinguish it with other 
competitors. Specific assets can take the form of site, physical asset, dedicated assets, or 
human asset. When a firm with specific assets has an optimal organizational form based 
on interplay of technical efficiency and agency efficiency, it will generate rent that is 
synonymous with economic profit (Besanko, Dranove, & Shanley, 2000). R&D 
expenditures are major decision variables for managers who wish to build up firm 
specific assets. A firm will make investments in R&D only if the investments provided 
it with a unique position in the market from which to capture rents (Caves, 1982; Teece 
1988). Firms in an industry can use different tangible or intangible assets, and pursue 
different strategies to improve their performance (Porter, 1979). Differences in 
profitability and accounting performance among firms may well reflect rents from firm 
specific assets accumulated from a superior management team or an effective R&D 
laboratory (Markides, 1995).    
There are several studies that identified variables including R&D intensity and 
advertising as predictors of profitability (Ravenscraft, 1983; Scherer, 1980; and 
Shepherd, 1972). The effect of R&D intensity on firm profitability has generally been 
found to be positive (Scherer, 1980).  
The association between R&D expenditure and diversification has been 
investigated to answer the question of why firms diversify. One group suggested that 
firms might improve the efficiency of R&D expenditure through diversification because 
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of economics of scope (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1986; Hambrick & MacMillan, 1985; 
Porter, 1985). Other researchers suggested that highly diversified firms have control 
system that may lead division mangers to reduce long-term expenditures such as R&D. 
Thus there appears to be a negative relationship between diversification and R&D 
intensity (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hoskisson & Hitt, 1988). However, 
organizational analysts have not looked at the effect of proliferation of subsidiary levels 
on performance. Largely because these analysts still measure diversification by 
counting divisions, not subsidiaries. Corporate performance in terms of market share is 
significantly increased by R&D intensity (Franco, 1989). I expect negative relationship 
between R&D and MOOH, because MOOH is a functional substitute for R&D. When 
corporations are growing rapidly they are more likely purchase than develop products 
and processes. The cost of purchasing product lines is less than developing their own 
product lines. 
Hypothesis 6: R&D intensity is a cause of firm profitability (accounting
 performance) and it helps the firm build specific assets and thus increases its 
profitability.  
 
Advertising Intensity 
In transaction cost economics, along with R&D expenditure, advertisement 
expenditures are one of major strategic decision variables for managers to capture rents 
(Porter, 1979). Rent is generated from transaction-specific investment that would 
require the production process involving non-standardized inputs as found in 
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differentiated products. This process is facilitated when consumer awareness 
distinguishes product characteristics from the advertisement (Comanor & Wilson, 
1967). The positive relationship between advertising intensity and firm profitability is 
identified in many studies (Ravenscraft, 1983; Scherer, 1980; and Shepherd, 1972). 
Advertising analysts view advertising either as a dynamic force operating as an 
engine for brand innovation and other types of change in the marketplace, or at least a 
defensive mean of protecting the status quo of brand awareness (Jones, 1990). 
Regardless of which perspective is followed, advertising is posited to increase profits of 
corporations. In his empirical study (Jones, 1995), he drew a conclusion that advertising 
is capable of a sharp immediate effect on sales increase that generally means profit 
increase. A successful brand that is identified by consumers is beneficial to firms in 
commanding a premium price, deriving above-average purchase frequency, and making 
advertising budget is more efficient (Jones, 1997).        
Bettis (1981) found that the differentiation of firm on the basis of advertising 
and R&D is major source of performance advantage of related diversified corporations. 
He concluded that performance differences between related and unrelated diversified 
corporations are associated with advertising expenditures, accounting determined risk, 
research and development expenditures and capital intensity. For their analysis on the 
risk/return performance of diversified corporations, Bettis & Mahajan (1985) included 
advertising intensity as an indicator of product differentiation because of the monopoly 
power associated with product differentiation. Grossman (1996) tried to measure the 
level of long-term expenditures using proxy variables including advertising intensity. 
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Likewise, Franco (1989) and Grossman (1996) found that advertising expenditures are 
associated with long-term firm performance. 
 Hypothesis 7: Advertising intensity is a positive cause of corporate accounting 
Performance.  
  
Summary 
The variables chosen for this study are return on assets, size, multi-
organizational ownership hierarchy, related diversification, unrelated diversification, 
institutional investors, debt, R&D intensity and advertising intensity. Rather than 
advocating a single perspective, my research is based on three perspectives; historical 
managerial theory, agency theory, and transaction cost economics. The finding of this 
research will shed light on the efficacy of each in explaining corporate accounting 
performance. The following chapter will introduce the tool used to unveil the causal 
relationship among the nine variables studied. 
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CHAPTER III 
 DIRECTED ACYCLIC GRAPHS 
 
Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) can be used to distinguish genuine from 
spurious causes in a set of data. Further they can be helpful in indicating what other 
variables are needed in a model, in order to measure one variable’s effect on another. 
Finally, DAGs are useful in representing how one variable causes another via other 
variables. That is, the differentiation of direct cause and indirect cause becomes clear 
with DAG-type analysis.  
 
Introduction 
Theory may suggest a relationship among a set of variables. If we want to 
estimate or test this relationship, the way in which our data are obtained is important. 
When we have control over variables, in other words, when we perform a controlled 
experiment, we obtain unbiased estimates of the prior theoretical relationships. 
However, social scientists can not run experiments on human organization. Theory of 
social science usually requires the ceteris paribus condition that is not generally 
satisfied in observational data. Experimental methods work because they use 
randomization, random assignment of subjects to alternative treatments, to account for 
any additional variation associated with the unknown variables in a system (Campbell 
& Stanley, 1963).  
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The corporate data used in studies of organizational behavior are primarily 
observational and often secondary, not collected explicitly for the study but rather for 
some other primary purpose. We are not able to use experimental methods in the 
analysis of various decisions on strategy and structure. 
The directed graph approach that we describe here is designed to aid researchers 
working with non-experimental data. The methods look to assign causal flows to a set 
of variables, which the problem and theory suggests should be related, even if we don’t 
know exactly how.   
Causal systems imply a set of asymmetries between causes and effects. In 
systems involving time, it is oftentimes the case that causes comes before the effect.  So 
if variables X and Y measured at time t and t + k, Xt → Yt+k is inconsistent with        
Yt+k → Xt. Other asymmetries in causal relationships exist. Several of these are 
discussed in Hausman (1998). For at least three variables asymmetries in “screening 
off” have been central in the development of directed acyclic graphs.  
 Consider the non-time sequence asymmetry in causal relations. For a causally 
sufficient set of three variables X, Y and Z, illustrate a causal fork, X causes Y and Z, 
as: Y← X →Z. Here the unconditional association between Y and Z is nonzero (as both 
Y and Z have a common cause in X), but the conditional association between Y and Z 
given knowledge of the common cause X, is zero: knowledge of a common cause 
screens off association between its joint effects. 
The inverted causal fork that X and Z cause Y can be illustrated as X→ Y ← Z. 
Here the unconditional association between X and Z is zero, but the conditional 
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association between X and Z given knowledge of the common effect Y is not zero: 
common effects do not screen off association between their joint causes. Finally 
consider the causal chain Y→ X →Z. The unconditional association between X and Z is 
non-zero; however given knowledge of Y, the association between X and Z is zero. So 
the middle variable in a causal chain screens off association between endpoints. These 
screening off phenomena are captured in the literature of directed graphs (Papineau, 
1985). 
 
Definition of Directed Acyclic Graph 
A directed graph is a picture representing the causal flow among a set of 
variables. More formally, it is and ordered triple <V, M, E> where V is a non-empty set 
of variables, M is a non-empty set of symbols attached to the end of undirected edges, 
and E is a set of ordered pairs. Each members of E is called an edge. Variables 
connected by an edge are said to be adjacent. If we have X and Y in the set V, their 
relationship can be shown one of the following ways: undirected edge (X  Y), 
directed edge (X → Y), bi-directed edge (X ↔ Y), non-directed edge (X oo Y), 
and partially directed edge (X o→ Y). There are several graphs associated with 
edges: (i) an undirected graph only with undirected edges; (ii) a directed graph only 
with directed edges; (iii) an inducing path graph contains both directed and bi-directed 
edges; (iv) a partially oriented inducing path graph contains directed, bi-directed, non-
  38 
  
directed, and partially directed edges13. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a graph that 
contains no directed cycles and is able to represent causal relationships.  
Directed acyclic graphs are designs for representing conditional independence as 
implied by the recursive product decomposition:  
                          Pr(X1 , X2 , X3 , … Xn ) = ∏
=
n
i 1
Pr(Xi | Pai ),               (3.1) 
where Pr is the probability of variables X’s and the symbol ? refers the product 
operator. The symbol Pai refers to the realization of some subset of the variables that 
precede (come before in a causal sense). Pearl (1986) proposed d-separation as a 
graphical characterization of conditional independence based on the above equation14. If 
we formulate a directed acyclic graph in which the variables corresponding to are 
represented as the parents (direct cause) of X, then the independence implied by 
equation (1) can be read off the DAG using the criterion of d-separation.  
 
D-Separation Criterion 
Consider three disjoint sets of variables, X, Y, and Z, in a directed acyclic graph 
G.  To decide whether X is independent of Y given Z, we need to test whether the 
variables in Z block all paths from variables in X to variables in Y. A path is a sequence 
of consecutive edges (of any directionality) in the graph, and blocking is to be 
interpreted as stopping the flow of information between variables that are connected by 
such paths. Formal definition of d-separation is as follows: 
                                                 
13 For more detailed description of edges and graphs see Spirtes et al. (2000). 
14  A proof of this proposition was provided by Verma and Pearl (1988). 
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A set Z is said to d-separate X from Y if and only if Z blocks every path from a 
variable in X to a variable in Y. And a path P is said to be d-separated (or 
blocked) by a set of variables Z if and only if 1. p contains a chain i → m → j or 
a fork i ← m → j such that the middle variable m is in Z, or 2. p contains an 
inverted fork (or collider) I → m ← j such that the middle node m is not in Z and 
such that no descendant of m is in Z (Pearl, 2000: 16).  
 In other words, if information flow is characterized by condition 1 in the above 
definition then the middle variable m must be part of the “blocking” or conditioning set 
Z. However if information flow is characterized by condition 2 (above), them m cannot 
be conditioned on to block information flow.  
  
PC Algorithm 
The notion of d-separation has been applied in computer algorithms that search 
for causal structure in observational data. IC algorithm was developed by Verma and 
Pearl (1990), and PC algorithm was developed by Spirtes, and Glymour (1991). I 
briefly present elements of PC algorithm, since it is more general systematic way for 
building directed graphs and was further developed as an automated module to help 
build causal models (TETRADII)15. 
                                                 
15 Structural equation model (SEM) is a system of linear equations and some statistical constraints. This is 
the multivariate procedure that, as defined by Ullman (1996), “allows examination of a set of 
relationships between one or more independent variables, either continuous or discrete, and one or more 
dependent variables, either continuous or discrete.” Several softwares are available to get SEM. They are 
EQS, CALIS, LISREL, etc. The reason I am not using those or the reason I am cautious to use SEM is as 
follows. “Once again, SEM cannot test directionality in relationships. The directions of arrows in a 
structural equation model represent the researcher’s hypotheses of causality within a system. The 
researcher’s choice of variables and pathways represented will limit the structural equation model’s 
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 PC algorithm is an ordered set of commands that begins with a general 
unrestricted set of relationships among variables and proceeds step-wise to remove 
edges between variables and then direct causal flow. The algorithm is described in 
detail in Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000: 84). It begins with a complete 
undirected graph G on the vertex set X. The complete, undirected, graph shows an 
undirected edge between every variable of the system (every variable in X). Edges 
between variables are removed sequentially based on zero-order conditional 
independence relations, again on first order conditional independence relations, and so 
on. The conditioning variable(s) on removed edges between two variables is called the 
sepset of the variables whose edge has been removed (for vanishing zero order 
conditioning information the sepset is the empty set). Once all possible edges are 
removed based on conditional correlation tests, edges are directed. The notion of sepset 
is crucial for this purpose. Edges are directed by considering triples X  Y  Z, such 
that X and Y are connected as are Y and Z, but X and Z are not connected. Direct edges 
between triples: X  Y  Z as X → Y ← Z if Y is not in the sepset of X and Z. If X 
→ Y, Y and Z are connected, X and Z are not connected, and there is no arrowhead at 
Y, then orient Y  Z as Y → Z. If there is a directed path from X to Y, and an edge 
between X and Y, then direct X  Y as X → Y.   
In application of PC algorithm, Fisher’s Z is used to test whether conditional 
correlations are significantly different from zero.  
                                                                                                                                               
ability to recreate the sample covariance and variance patterns that have been observed in nature”. (Ricka 
Stoelting, http://online.sfsu.edu/~efc/classes/biol710/path/ SEMwebpage.htm) 
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Z(ρ ( i, j | k) n)=1 /2 ( n - | k | - 3 )1/2 × ln { ( | 1 + r ( i , j | k ) | ) × ( | 1 – r ( i , j | k ) | )-1 },       (3.2) 
where n is the number of observations used to estimate the correlations, ρ(i, j|k) 
is the population correlation between series i and j conditional on series k (removing the 
influence of series k on each i and j), and |k| is the number of variables in k (that we 
condition on). If i, j and k are normally distributed and r(i, j|k) is the sample conditional 
correlation of i and j given k, then the distribution of z(ρ(i,j|k)n) – z(r(i,j|k)n) is standard 
normal. 
 
Limitation and Significance Level 
Application of TETRAD II on observational data must be done with caution. In 
general, the correctness of the output of the model-building module in TETRAD II 
depends upon several factors (Scheines, Spirtes, Glymour, & Meek, 1994). First, one 
needs to have included in the set of observational data a causally sufficient set of 
variables. This means that there is no omitted variable that in fact causes any two of the 
included variables under study. If variable X causes both Y and Z and we leave X out of 
the analysis, then an apparent causal flow from Y to Z (or vice versa) may be due to the 
fact that X causes both Y and Z, so the causal flow identified as running from Y to Z 
would be spurious (Suppes, 1970). 
Second, one needs to constrain himself/herself to causal flows that respect a 
causal Markov condition. That is to say, if X causes Y and Y causes Z, we can factor 
the underlying probability distribution on X, Y, and Z as 
Pr(X,Y,Z)=Pr(X)Pr(Y|X)Pr(Z|Y). In words, we require the causal flows that we attempt 
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to uncover to respect the genealogy condition that one need only condition on his/her 
parents in order to fully capture the probability distribution generating any variable. 
One need not condition on other genealogical relatives such as grandparents or uncles, 
aunts, or siblings. 
Finally, the probability distribution we attempt to capture by directed graph, G, 
is faithful to G if X and Y are dependent if and only if there is an edge between X and 
Y. This last condition tells us that we cannot have cancellations of “deep underlying” 
parameters. When zero correlation is observed between two variables, it is because they 
are not related not because of cancellations of deeper “fundamental” causal parameters 
connecting two or more variables in the true system.  
PC algorithm can commit either arrowhead commission error or edge 
commission error. Arrowhead commission error is to include an arrowhead where it 
does not belong. Edge commission error is to put an edge where it does not belong. 
Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (2000) have explored several versions of PC algorithm 
on simulated data with respect to errors on both edge inclusion and direction. And they 
conclude that in order for the method to converge to correct decisions with probability 
one, the significance level used in making decisions should decrease as the sample size 
increases, and the use of high significance levels (e.g. .2 at sample sizes less than 100, 
and .1 at sample sizes between 100 and 300) may improve performance at small sample 
sizes.   
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Regression Analysis: The Adjustment Problem 
Given the directed graph, we can sometimes use regression analysis to measure 
the effect of X on Y. The directed graph will provide us guidelines on what variables 
we should condition on in a regression equation in order to measure the size of the 
effect of variable X on variable Y. When one is not careful, one can mis-specify a 
regression equation if he condition on (includes “blocking” variables) an improper set 
of variables. The “adjustment problem” by Pearl (2000) provides the answer for this 
fundamental problem. I introduce the procedure in detail since it is crucial when to 
decide whether a factor is to be included in order to measure the effect of a particular 
variable (ex. Diversification) on another variable (ex. corporate performance). 
When we are applying the “adjustment problem” on the directed graph depicted 
in Figure 3.1, the procedure for factor selection is as follows: 
Test if Z7 and Z9 are sufficient measurements to condition in order to measure the effect 
of X on Y. 
Step 1: Z7 and Z9 should not be descendants of X. 
Step 2: Delete all non-ancestors of {X,Y,Z}. 
Step 3: Delete all arcs emanating from X. 
Step 4: Connect any two parents sharing a common child. 
Step 5: Strip arrow-heads from all edges. 
Step 6: Delete Z7 and Z9 from the graph.  
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Test : If X is disconnected from Y in the remaining graph, then Z7and Z9 are appropriate 
measurements to condition on. In other words, in order to measure the effect of X on Y 
correctly given Figure 3.1, Z7 and Z9 should be included in a regression equation. 
The essence of the “adjustment problem” is well understood in applied 
econometrics. We have a standard result: to measure the effect of X on Y using ordinary 
least squares regression, in a linear representation, Y = Xβ + ε, the variable X must not 
be correlated with ε. If there is an omitted variable (Z) that cause X and Y, it would 
show up in the above equation as one component of our error term ε. Its graphic 
representation would be 
   ε  
 
Y  X. 
      β 
To measure β (the true effect of X on Y), we need to “block” the backdoor path X← ε 
→Y, by including the variable Z in the regression equation. So the proper regression 
would be Y = Xβ1 + Zβ2 + ε*, where ε* is the residual not having Z as one of its 
components. 
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Figure 3.1 
Causal Graph Illustrating the “Adjustment Problem” (Pearl, 2000) 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
This chapter outlines the methods used to test hypotheses developed in Chapter 
II. A description of the sample, data source, and measurement follows in the first to 
third sections.   
 
Sample  
The sampling is from the 1999 Fortune 500 list (for the year 1998) that is ranked 
by revenue of corporation. The period under study is 1990-1998 when the economy of 
U.S. experienced steady growth after the recession of the early 1980’s16. There are few 
studies covering this most recent past decade. Most studies of corporate performance 
have been conducted for the decade of the 1980’s.  
The rationale for tracking presently existing firms backward in time rather than 
forwards is that there is a larger volume of information and more electronic data base 
for the more recent time period (Armor & Teece, 1978). This analysis is performed on 
U.S. corporations except financial sectors, which survived from 1990 to 1998. Because 
I am not analyzing the risk of survival and because I want to ensure that the 
corporations selected remained in the sample through the 1990-1998 time frames, I 
have omitted all corporations, which did not survive throughout this period. I used the 
industry classifications from the Fortune instead of Standard Industrial Classification 
                                                 
16 I checked various measures provided from the Economic Cycle Research Institute. They are U.S. 
business cycle dates and U.S. growth rate cycle dates.  
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(SIC) to exclude some industries from my study. This process is necessary to maintain 
comparability and consistency with previous research on the relationships of interest17. 
In the Fortune, U.S. industry is grouped into 70 different industry sectors. Among them, 
I excluded industry sectors related to banking, insurance, and all diversified financial 
firms, and health care. They are commercial banks, diversified financials, insurance: 
life, health, insurance: P&C, health care, saving institutions, and securities. This yields 
318 firms in my data set.  
When counting the subsidiaries of parent corporations, foreign held entities of 
U.S. parent corporations were not included because they have different regulatory and 
business environments than domestic entities (Zey, 1996; 1998). The number of 
corporations in the sample is further limited by checking accessibility of relevant 
strategy, structure, and performance data. When I encountered a missing observation on 
a single variable for a corporation the following substitution methods provide the order 
in this I made missing data decision18. First, I used mean values of two contiguous years 
for a corporation. Second, when the first option was not available, the mean value of the 
time frame of the corporation was used. When neither of the two previous options was 
available, the industry average of the year was substituted. If none of these was 
                                                 
17 Direct comparison with other studies might not be available, because many previous studies on 
corporate performance selected samples using two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 
between 20 and 40. In my study, among final sample of 190 companies, 36 of them are indexed either 
before 20 or after 40 in terms of the two-digit SIC codes. Though broader coverage of  industry sectors 
makes direct comparison with previous studies difficult, more generalized explanation of corporate 
performance covering various industries becomes possible. The access of all relevant strategy, structure, 
and performance data for financial sectors is much more problematic than the access for non-financial 
sectors.  
18 This process is necessary in order to perform regression analysis for longitudinal data. Due to 
incomplete reporting in R&D and advertising data, mean substitution for missing data were used (Hill, 
Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992).   
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available, the observation was discarded. 128 firms are discarded because of missing 
data. Thus, the number of sample is 190 firms and the number of observation available 
for the analysis is 1710 (190*9) that is 190 companies for nine years. The size of the 
corporations in the final sample ranged from $3 billion to $178 billion in revenue in 
1998.  
 
Sources of Data19 
The sources of data include Compustat, CompactD, Spectrum 3:13(f), SDC 
Platinum, America’s Corporate Families: The Billion Dollar Directory, and Global 
Researcher. The data on financial variables (asset, debt, sales, dividend, revenue, etc.) 
and others (employee, R&D expense, advertisement expense) were collected from the 
annual data in Compustat, which records these data for each year. The data on 
ownership hierarchy (number of division, branch, subsidiary at each level) were 
collected from America’s Corporate Families: The Billion Dollar Directory. The 
number of branches was added to the number of divisions to ensure the more stringent 
test of my model. The data on institutional investors ownership (percent shares held by 
institutional investors) were collected from either CompactD or Spectrum 3:13(f)20. The 
data on diversification (sales in each industry for a firm) were collected from the 
industry segment file from Compustat. The description of business and other 
supplementary information to trace the history and name changes of corporations were 
                                                 
19 Most of the data for this study was collected while I was working for Corporate Strategy and Structure 
Project funded by Texas A&M University and by Zey.  I’d like to thanks Mary Zey for allowing me to 
use the data. 
20 CompactD is electronic source of Spectrum 3:13(f) data.  
  49 
  
collected from the Global Researcher. Table 4.1 summarizes the sources and measures 
of variables.  
 
Measurement 
The measures were chosen to represent performance, size, ownership hierarchy, 
and various strategies of corporations in the study. This study analyzes the economic 
performance of the largest U.S. manufacturing corporations from 1990-1998. As I 
described in Chapter II, ROA was chosen to measure corporate accounting 
performance. The return on assets of the firm was calculated by dividing operating 
income before interest and taxes and after depreciation by total assets for each of the 
years 1990 to 1998. To control for industry effects21 on accounting performance, I used 
a relative measure of firm ROA (ROA*). Each firm’s ROA is adjusted by subtracting 
the dominant two-digit industry average ROA (Hitt et al, 1996; Hoskisson et al, 1993; 
Hoskisson et al., 1994)22.  A relative firm ROA for ith  firm in jth industry is thus 
calculated as follows:  
ROAij* = ROAi - M (j), where M(j) = ∑
=
N
i
ij NROA
1
/ , i = 1, .., M, j = 1, .., 38,  M<N and 
M is the number of firms in jth industry from my sample, N is the number of firms in jth  
                                                 
21 In the traditional structure/conduct/performance paradigm from industrial organization economists, 
corporate performance mainly depends on the industry effect from market structure (Bettis, 1981).   
22 The dominant two-digit industry represents the segment producing the majority of the firm’s sales. 
Two-digit industries are based on Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes. Hoskisson, Johnson, and 
Moesel (1993) indicate that the analysis using industry averages by primary SIC codes and the analysis 
using weighted industry averages by each SIC code showed similar results.     
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Table 4.1 
Variables Used in the Analysisa 
Category Variable Measure Data source 
Performance    
  Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
 
The operating income after 
depreciation to assets ratio 
Compustat, 
(I13-I14)/I6 
  
 
  Return on Sales (ROS) The operating income after 
depreciation to sales ratio 
Compustat, 
(I13-I14)/I12 
     
Structure    
 Corporate Size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets  
Natural logarithm of number of 
employees 
Compustat, I6, I29 
  
Multi-Organizational 
Ownership Hierarchy 
(MOOH) 
 
The number of the levels to reveal the 
hierarchy structure 
 
America’s Corporate 
Families 
    
Strategy    
 Related Diversification 
(RD) 
Extent a firm operates in number of 
different product lines within an 
industry 
Compustat Business 
Segment  
  
Unrelated 
Diversification (UD) 
 
 
Extent a firm operates in number of 
different industries 
 
Compustat Business 
Segment 
  
Institutional Investors 
(INST) 
 
End of the year % of total outstanding 
common voting shares owned by 
institutional investors 
 
Compact D 
   
Financial Pressure 
(DEBT) 
 
The ratio of total current liabilities to 
equity 
The ratio of long-term debt to equity 
 
Compustat, 
(I5/I60, I9/I60) 
  Research and 
Development Intensity 
(R&D)  
 
The firm’s R&D to sales ratio 
 
Compustat,  
(I46/I12) 
   
Advertising Intensity 
(ADV) 
 
 
The firm’s advertising to sales ratio 
 
Compustat,  
(I45/I12) 
a This table provides the variables, and the sources of variables.     
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industry from Compustat . Also the relative firm return on sales (ROS*) was calculated 
in the same way to derive relative firm return on assets (ROA*). The inclusion of ROS* 
in the analysis allows me to check the consistency of the results from DAGs and the 
following regressions by changing the measure of corporate accounting performance.  
Size is measured by both the natural logarithm of total assets (Armour & Teece, 
1978; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989, Lubatkin, & Chatterjee, 1991) and the natural 
logarithm of number of employees (Hoskisson et al., 1993). As the case in accounting 
performance measure, multiple measures of size allow me to check the consistency of 
the analysis results. 
 Multi-organizational ownership hierarchy (MOOH) is defined as a vertical 
ownership structure in which an organization controls multiple numbers of legally 
separated organizations held at several levels23. MOOH measures the levels of 
ownership in form of subsidiaries. Suppose a parent company owns subsidiaries down 
to the second level, it is recorded as two levels below the corporate parent executive 
office .  
Diversification is a primary corporate strategic focus. However, measuring 
diversification is not a clear and unambiguous task. Among the many measures of 
diversification, the entropy measure of diversification, originally developed by 
Jacquemin and Berry (1979), has been used by strategy researchers in response to the 
need for an objective measure that can addresses strategic differences (Hoskisson et al., 
1993). Entropy measures address not only the number of categories, but also the 
                                                 
23 First level subsidiary is owned and controlled by a parent company and second level subsidiary is 
owned and controlled by the first level subsidiary so on.   
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distribution of sales among the separate business categories. It has been accepted in the 
literature as the most objective way compared to categorical measures or simple SIC 
count measures (Hoskisson et al., 1993). In this frame, diversification can be divided 
into related (RD) and unrelated diversification (UD). The standard industrial 
classification (SIC) is used to define related and unrelated product groups. Products 
belonging to different four-digit SIC industries within the same two-digit industry group 
are treated as related. Products from different two-digit SIC industry group are treated 
as unrelated. Contrary to a simple SIC count measure, this measure addresses not only 
the number of categories, but also the distribution among the separate business 
categories. In other words, sales or revenues in entropy measure, weight firm’s 
activities in each product group or industry group. The entropy components of 
diversification are defined as follows: Entropy measures= ∑Pjln(1/Pj) where j is defined 
as the share segment j in the firm sales and  ln(1/Pj) is the weight for each segment j that 
is the logarithm of the inverse of its sales.  Related diversification (RD) is defined as the 
diversification arising out of operating in 4-digit segments within 2-digit industry group, 
with industry group sales defined as the sales in 2-digit industry. Unrelated 
diversification (UD) is defined as the diversification arising from operating between 2-
digit industry groups, with total firms sales as the sales reference. Total diversification 
is formed by adding the two components of the entropy measures, related and unrelated 
diversification (Hoskisson et al., 1992). These three components are calculated for each 
firm for each year of the study.   
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R&D intensity is measured by the ratio of R&D expenses to sales, representing 
all costs incurred relating to development of new products or services. Advertising 
intensity is measured by the ratio of firm’s advertisement to sales.  
Ownership by institutional investors is the end of the year percent of total 
outstanding common voting shares owned by institutional investors. Debt (financial 
pressure) is measured by both the ratio of total current liabilities24 to equity and the ratio 
of long-term debt25 to equity. As the case in performance measure and size measure, 
multiple measures of debt allow me to check the consistency of the analysis result.  
 
Analysis Method 
 The following analysis techniques were used. First, after data was summarized, I 
adjusted return ratios using industry average in order to remove an industry effect from 
the data. Second, I developed DAGs and tested which perspectives were applicable in 
explaining causal relationship among variables. Third, I measured the intensity o 
f relation among variables, applying some prior tests to choose appropriate estimation 
method. Fourth, based on the DAG, I estimated total effect and direct effect. Fifth, I 
compared the DAG model with the full model in several aspects.     
A number of the studies have suggested that industry effects have the most 
impact on the profitability of diversified firms (Bettis & Hall, 1982; Chang & Thomas, 
1989; Montgomery, 1985). To avoid misleading interpretations, the potential industry 
                                                 
24 This item represents debt and other liabilities due within one year and includes the current portion of 
long-term debt (Compustat).  
25 This item represents interest-bearing obligations due after the current year (Compustat). 
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effects on performance should be accounted for in research examining the 
diversification-performance relationship (Datta, Rajagopalan, & Rasheed, 1991; 
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). It becomes easier to 
compare the current study with selected previous studies when industry effects are 
controlled. Accordingly, the measure of accounting performance was adjusted by the 
industry average in order to remove any industry effects (Hoskisson et al, 1993; Keats 
& Hitt, 1988).  
For size, debt, and accounting performance, multiple measures were developed 
to offer evidence of the stability of derived models from the DAG. From each DAG for 
different measures, the model generating weighted return was derived based on Markov 
Property that allows us to only conditional on parents (direct cause) (Pearl, 2000; 
Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 2000).  
The DAGs for different measures of size, leverage, and accounting performance 
were derived using TETRAD II and scored using model-fitness criteria, such as Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Schwartz criterion (SC). Both, Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) and Schwartz criterion (SC) penalize the loss of degrees of freedom that 
occurs when a model size is expanded (Green, 2000). AIC and SC are statistical loss 
functions which balance “fit” and “parsimony” in model specification. The goal is to 
select the model that minimizes the criterion.  The formula of AIC = log (e’e/n) + 2K/n 
,and  the formula SC = LOG (e’e/n) + K log n/n , where n is number of observations, K 
is number of parameters. 
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The correlation matrix being used as an input in the TETRAD II has nine 
variables including a profitability measure. This has repeated for two different 
profitability measures, i.e., return on asset, and return on sales. I expect to see some 
consistency across different measures of profitability, different measures of size, and 
different measures of debt. 
 Since the analysis is based on longitudinal data, there is a possibility of 
violating the classical assumptions of regression. Tests were conducted to check for 
cross-sectional heteroscedasticigy and cross-sectional correlation, respectively. Also an 
autoregressive process of order one (AR(1)) is adopted as a candidate for the residual 
process. Models based on this AR(1) error process were compared with models with no 
error autoregressive process to define autocorrelation. LM tests were conducted to 
check cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and Breusch-Pegan test was applied for cross-
sectional correlation (Green, 2000). 
Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test was conducted to check cross-sectional 
heteroscedasticity. LM is calculated as: T/2 
N
i 1=
∑ ( (σii / σ2) – 1 )2  where σij  = 1/T 
T
t 1=
∑ eit ejt , σ2 = 1/N N
i 1=
∑ σii,  N is number of cross sectional units, and T is time period. 
The statistic of LM test has a chi-square distribution with N-1 degrees of freedom. The 
null hypothesis under the LM test is σi = σ.  
The Breusch-Pegan (B-P) test is applied for cross-sectional correlation. B-P LM 
is calculated as T
N
i 2=
∑ 1
1
−
=
∑i
j
rij2  where  rij2 = σij2 / σijσjj ,  N is number of cross sectional 
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units, and T is time period. The statistic of B-P LM test has asymptotic chi-square 
distribution with N(N-1)/2 degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis under the B-P test is 
σij = 0 when i ≠ j. 
Based on these tests, appropriate estimation methods were chosen. Full models 
with different measures were estimated in order to access the stability of the model. A 
DAG model with hierarchy structure and a DAG model without hierarchy structure 
were estimated in order to evaluate the advisability of inclusion. For the variables that 
are not included in the DAG model from the Markov property as direct causes, the 
“adjustment problem” method (Pearl, 2000) was applied to measure the indirect effect 
on accounting performance (for them, indirect effect is same with total effect). 
Finally, forecasting ability was compared between a full model and the DAG 
model using Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE). Root Mean Squared Error is MSE  
and MSE  =  
2190
1
)(
190
1 ∑
=
∧−
i
iWROAWROAi . This comparison was conducted on an out-of-
sample period. The model with smaller RMSE has better predictive accuracy of 
forecasting.  
It may be appropriate to use a formal test for judging which model is preferred 
in terms of forecasting performance. If knowledge of the first entails knowledge of the 
second, the first is said to encompass the second. The requirement of encompassing is 
that the competing model embodies no useful information absent in the preferred 
model. Encompassing is related to conventional misspecification analysis and 
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composite forecasting (Hendry, 1995). Denote two forecast error series by eit, i = 1,2, 
and the composite forecast error by εt, a white noise term, and write  
                e1t = λ(e1t - e2t) + εt       (4.1) 
The null hypothesis is λ = 0. When the null is true, according to Chong and 
Hendry (1986), the first model encompasses the second in terms of forecasting 
performance. The actual test involves an ordinary least square regression e1t on (e1t - 
e2t). A t-test of estimate of λ is used as our test for encompassing.    
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
 This chapter presents the results of the causal modeling effort, the theory of 
which is set forth in Chapter III. Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables 
under analysis are presented in Table 5.1. Since MOOH has never been introduced in 
the empirical study, descriptive analysis of MOOH is conducted. Table 5.2 and Table 
5.3 present the results from the descriptive analysis of MOOH. Table 5.4 through Table 
5.7 present the results of application of TETRADII to alternative data sets. Alternative 
measures of accounting performance, debt, and size are applied to find directed acyclic 
graphs (DAGs) using TETRADII. The results of regression analyses suggested by the 
DAG results are provided in Tables 5.8 through 5.16. 
 
Association of Variables   
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables 
used in the study. The correlation between multi-organizational ownership hierarchy 
(MOOH) and relative return on assets (ROA*) provides prima facie evidence that 
changes in ownership hierarchy (vertical financial ownership) are related to corporate 
accounting performance. The correlation between MOOH and diversification (DR, DU) 
as well as the correlation between MOOH and SIZE show strong relationships as well. 
The variables that have strong relationship with ROA* in terms of correlation are 
unrelated diversification (DU), R&D intensity (R&D), advertisement (ADV), and 
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MOOH. In order to find out whether these four variables are direct causes of ROA* and 
to reveal the causal relationships among other variables, TETRADII is applied. The 
results follow.  
 
Descriptive Analysis of MOOH 
Table 5.2 presents the change in corporate entities of the 1999 Fortune 500 
largest U.S. firms, 1980, 1990, and 1998. It shows that the majority of units held by the 
parent company are in the form of subsidiaries by the 1990s. The data from 1980 to 
1998 show that many industrial corporations no longer held their entities as divisions 
but as subsidiaries. Further, the data show that the levels of subsidiarization increased 
from 1980 to 1998. In other words, multi-organizational ownership hierarchies have 
become deeper. 
The mean numbers of divisions per corporation has declined from 8.9 to 7.3 in 
1980s and from 7.3 to 4.5 in 1990s. As the data shows, these changes are more 
significant in 1990s than 1980s. In contrast, the mean number of domestic subsidiaries 
owned by US firms has drastically increased from 1.5 to 14.9 in 1980s and from 14.9 to 
32.8 in 1990s. The mean number of levels of subsidiaries tells a similar story. It 
increased from .49 to 1.6 in 1980s and from 1.6 to 2.5 in 1990s. Paired t-tests are used 
to determine the statistical difference of means. All of these changes are significant at 
the 5% level, except the change of number of  divisions between 1980 and 198926.  
                                                 
26Analysis of all years from 1980 to 1998 offers similar results. Since the trends explained above are 
consistent over this period, only the summary covering three data points is reported.  
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Table 5.2 
Change in Corporate Entities of the 1999 Fortune 500 Largest U.S. Firms,  
in 1980, 1990, and 1998a 
 Mean Difference of 
Mean 
SE T-ratio 2-tailed 
Significance 
Divisions      
1998 4.5     
  2.8 1.0 2.85 .005 
1989 7.3     
  1.5 1.1 1.42 .155 
1980 8.9     
      
Subsidiaries      
1998 32.8     
  17.9 2.4 7.51 .000 
1989 14.9     
  13.4 1.1 12.40 .000 
1980 1.5     
      
Levels of 
Subsidiaries 
     
1998 2.53     
  0.94 0.08 10.74 .000 
1989 1.59     
  1.10 0.07 16.94 .000 
1980 0.49     
a Source: America’s Corporate Families: the Billion Dollar Directory. 1980, 1989, 1990. Parsippany, NJ: 
Dun & Bradstreet Inc. Each three years present the information of the subheading. Second column is the 
mean of subheading in each year. Third column is the mean difference between two years. Fourth column 
is the standard deviation of the mean difference. Fifth, and last column is for testing the null hypothesis: 
there is no mean difference between two years.   
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Table 5.3 provides more detailed description of how the ownership hierarchy of 
U.S. industrial firms has changed in 1990s. U.S. large industrial corporations hold 
subsidiaries down to eight levels. Mean values of the number of subsidiaries at each 
level are presented in column 4. The average number of subsidiaries in each level 
between 1990 and 1998 increases consistently for all the levels from 1990 to 1998. 
In Table 5.3 column 6, the number of parent corporations at each level at each 
maximum level is recorded. Among 190 parent companies in the study, the number of 
parent companies that do not own subsidiaries at all changes from 31 in 1990 to 8 in 
1998.  
 
Results of DAGs 
Following the suggestion from Spirtes et al., (2000), I set a 5% significance 
level as a maximum level for edge removal. An edge must be significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level or at the lower level to remain in the causal structure. The 
direction of causal flows is determined using the sepset conditions27 programmed in 
TETRAD II, which follows the rule that a common cause screens off association 
between its effects, while a common effect doesn’t screen off association between its 
possible causes. 
Using simulation with respect to errors on both edge inclusion (yes or no) and 
direction (arrow heading), Spirtes et al., (2000) conclude that in order for the method to 
                                                 
27 It is explained in PC algorithm in Chapter III. 
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Table 5.3 
The Change in Multi-Organizational Ownership Hierarchya 
Year Level of 
Ownership 
Hierarchy 
Number of 
Parent 
Companies 
owned each 
level 
Mean value of 
number of 
subsidiaries 
Lowest  
Level of 
Ownership 
Hierarchy 
Number of 
Parent 
Companies 
1998    Level 0 8 
 Level 1 182 15.2 Level 1 45 
 Level 2 137 12.6 Level 2 62 
 Level 3 74 10.5 Level 3 49 
 Level 4 26 10.2 Level 4 15 
 Level 5 11 19.6 Level 5 4 
 Level 6 7 10.0 Level 6 5 
 Level 7 2 3.0 Level 7 1 
 Level 8 1 1.0 Level 8 1 
1997    Level 0 11 
 Level 1 179 14.9 Level 1 53 
 Level 2 126 14.9 Level 2 54 
 Level 3 72 11.5 Level 3 45 
 Level 4 27 9.7 Level 4 12 
 Level 5 15 14.9 Level 5 9 
 Level 6 6 12 Level 6 3 
 Level 7 3 2.7 Level 7 2 
 Level 8 1 1.0 Level 8 1 
1991    Level 0 31 
 Level 1 159 15.0 Level 1 45 
 Level 2 114 11.1 Level 2 56 
 Level 3 58 6.6 Level 3 40 
 Level 4 18 7.3 Level 4 12 
 Level 5 6 4.5 Level 5 1 
 Level 6 5 9.8 Level 6 2 
 Level 7 3 1.3 Level 7 3 
 Level 8 0 0 Level 8 0 
1990    Level 0 31 
 Level 1 159 13.9 Level 1 45 
 Level 2 114 9.1 Level 2 63 
 Level 3 51 6.7 Level 3 36 
 Level 4 15 5.5 Level 4 8 
 Level 5 7 2.6 Level 5 3 
 Level 6 4 2.8 Level 6 2 
 Level 7 2 1 Level 7 2 
 Level 8 0 0 Level 8 0 
a Source: America’s Corporate Families: the Billion Dollar Directory. 1990-1998. Parsippany, NJ: Dun & 
Bradstreet Inc. 
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converge to correct decisions on edge inclusion and direction with probability 1, the 
significance level used in making decisions should decrease as the sample size 
increases. For example, Spirtes et al. (2000) suggest setting the significance level at 
10% when the sample size is 100 to 300 and at 5% or smaller for larger samples. The 
sample size in my study is 1710; that is, 190 corporations for nine years. Based on the 
suggestion from Spirtes et al., (2000), I set a 5% significance level as the maximum 
level for deciding edge direction in the DAG analysis. I did consider alternative 
significance levels to see how robust resulting DAGs were to the different levels.  
Further, multiple measures of size, leverage, and accounting performance were 
used to check the robustness of DAG representations to variable definitions. Total 
assets (SIZE1) and the number of employees (SIZE2) were used as alternative measure 
of firm size. Total current liabilities (DEBT1) and long-term debt (DEBT2) were used 
as measures of financial pressure from external financing. Accounting performance was 
measured by either the relative return on assets (ROA*) or the relative return on sales 
(ROS*). Since MOOH ,the measure of ownership hierarchy structure, has never been 
used in the literature, the DAG without MOOH was derived for comparison with the 
result of DAG with MOOH. 
For each combination of different measures of size, debt, and accounting 
performance, I compared the DAG results from different significance levels (5%, and 
10%). Spirtes, et al. (1994) recommended that users test for stability of the output under 
small variations of the significance level when applying TETRAD II. For the models 
that used ROA* as the measure of corporate accounting performance, most of edges 
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were not directed at 1% significance level. Since the 5% significance level was the 
lowest level indicating causal directions and Spirtes, et al. (2000) suggested 5% or 
lower significance level for large samples, 5% significance level DAGs were chosen for 
finding a causal model of corporate accounting performance. The results from 5% 
significance level and 10% significance level were compared to see the stability of 
outputs from TETRADII. All the comparisons consistently indicated that the causal 
directions from the chosen level (5%) were stable. I did not impose any restriction 
based on prior hypotheses28 in order to decide causal relationship. 
The results of DAGs are reported in four tables. Table 5.4 reports the result with 
ROA* used as the measure of accounting performance. Table 5.5 reports the result 
when the measure of ownership hierarchy (MOOH) is not included in deriving the 
DAG. Table 5.6 reports the result when ROS* is used as the measure of accounting 
performance instead of ROA*. Each table presents the results for two different 
significance levels. 
Table 5.4 presents four models with different measures of size and debt. The 
first model used SIZE1 as the measure of size and DEBT1 as the measure of debt. The 
second model used SIZE1 as the measure of size and DEBT2 as the measure of debt. 
The third model used SIZE2 as the measure of size and DEBT1 as the measure of debt. 
The fourth model used SIZE2 as the measure of size and DEBT1 as the measure of 
debt. In all four models, there were few changes in the edges and the directions of 
                                                 
28 TETRADII allows the researchers to supply information on timing; e.g. variable1 occurs before 
variable2, which prevents causal flows from variable2 to variable1 as the output of the model. Such prior 
knowledge was never used in this effort. 
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causal flows, comparing two different significance levels. There were more changes in 
the edges and directions of causal flows at different significance levels when SIZE2 was 
used (third and fourth model) than when used SIZE1 was used (first and second model). 
DEBT1 (first and third model) showed more causal relationship with other variables 
than DEBT2 (second and fourth model) did. The edges and directions of causal flows 
were stable with respect to changes in the measure of debt (between first and second 
model, between third and fourth model).    
Table 5.5 presents two models with different measures of debt. MOOH was not 
included in deriving causal relationship in these two models. The first model used 
DEBT1 as a measure of debt and the second model used DEBT2 as a measure of debt. 
Here, there were few changes in the edges and the directions of causal flows, at the 
different significance levels. As the case presented in Table 5.4, DEBT1 in the first 
model showed more relationships with another variables, than DEBT2 in the second 
model. The edges and directed causal flows were relatively unstable with respect to 
change in the measure of debt. The models with MOOH in Table 5.4 were more stable 
than the models without MOOH in Table 5.5, when changing the measure of debt. 
The Table 5.6 presents the models when ROS* was used as the measure of 
corporate accounting performance. The first model used DEBT1 as the measure of debt 
and the second model used DEBT2 as the measure of debt. In the two models, there 
were few changes in the edges and the directions of causal flows at different 
significance levels. As is case in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5, DEBT1 in the first model  
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Table 5.4 
DAG Result When ROA* is Useda 
 
Variables: ROA*, SIZE1, MOOH, RD, UD, INST, DEBT1, R&D, ADV  
Sample Size:1710 
Significance level = 0.050 Significance level = 0.100 
 
RD → MOOH RD → MOOH 
SIZE1 → RD SIZE1 → RD 
RD → INST RD → INST 
R&D → UD R&D → UD 
MOOH → UD MOOH → UD 
SIZE1 → UD SIZE1 → UD 
UD → ROA* UD → ROA* 
R&D → MOOH R&D → MOOH 
R&D → ROA* R&D → ROA* 
ADV → SIZE1 ADV → SIZE1 
ADV → ROA* ADV → INST 
MOOH → DEBT1 ADV → ROA* 
SIZE1 → MOOH MOOH → DEBT1 
MOOH → ROA* SIZE1 → MOOH 
SIZE1 → DEBT1 MOOH → ROA* 
DEBT1 → INST SIZE1 → DEBT1 
ROA* → DEBT1 DEBT1 → INST 
   ROA* → DEBT1 
 
Variables: ROA*, SIZE1, MOOH, RD, UD, INST, DEBT2, R&D, ADV 
Significance level = 0.050 Significance level = 0.100 
 
RD → MOOH RD → MOOH 
SIZE1 → RD SIZE1 → RD 
RD → INST RD → INST 
R&D → UD R&D → UD 
MOOH → UD MOOH → UD 
SIZE1 → UD SIZE1 → UD 
UD → ROA* UD → ROA* 
R&D → MOOH R&D → MOOH 
R&D → ROA* R&D → ROA* 
ADV → SIZE1 ADV → SIZE1 
ADV → ROA* ADV → INST 
SIZE1 → MOOH ADV → ROA* 
MOOH → ROA* MOOH → DEBT2 
DEBT2   SIZE1 → MOOH 
   MOOH → ROA* 
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Table 5.4 Continued 
Variables: ROA*, SIZE2, MOOH, RD, UD, INST, DEBT1, R&D, ADV 
Significance level = 0.050 Significance level = 0.100 
MOOH → RD RD → MOOH 
SIZE2 → RE RD → SIZE2 
RD → INST RD → INST 
UD  R&D UD  R&D 
UD  MOOH MOOH → UD 
UD  SIZE2 UD → SIZE2 
ROA* → UD UD → ROA* 
R&D → ROA* R&D → MOOH 
ADV  SIZE2 R&D → ROA* 
ADV → ROA* ADV → SIZE2 
MOOH  → DEBT1 INST → ADV 
MOOH  SIZE2 ADV → ROA* 
ROA* → MOOH MOOH → DEBT1 
INST → DEBT1 MOOH → SIZE2 
ROA* → SIZE2 MOOH → WRPA 
   DEBT1 → INST 
   DEBT1 → ROA* 
   ROA* → SIZE2 
Variables: ROA*, SIZE2, MOOH, RD, UD, INST, DEBT2, R&D, ADV 
Significance level = 0.050 Significance level = 0.100 
MOOH → RD MOOH → RD 
SIZE2 → RD SIZE2 → RD 
RD → INST RD → INST 
UD  R&D UD  R&D 
UD  MOOH UD  MOOH 
UD  SIZE2 UD → SIZE2 
ROA* → UD UD → ROA* 
R&D → ROA* R&D  MOOH 
ADV  SIZE2 R&D → ROA* 
ADV → ROA* ADV → SIZE2 
MOOH  SIZE2 ADV → INST 
ROA* → MOOH ADV → ROA* 
ROA* → SIZE2 MOOH → DEBT2 
DEBT2   MOOH → SIZE2 
   ROA* → MOOH 
   ROA* → SIZE2 
a Interpretation of symbols: A→B: A is a cause of B, A B: A is related with B, but the causal 
relationship is indecisive. Where, ROS* is weighted return on assets, SIZE1 is total assets, SIZE2 is the 
number of employees, RD is related diversification, UD is unrelated diversification, INST is institutional 
investors, DEBT1 is current liabilities total, DEBT2 is long term debt, R&D is research and development 
intensity, and ADV is advertisement intensity.  
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Table 5.5 
DAG Result without MOOHa 
 
Variables: ROA*, SIZE1, RD, UD, INST, DEBT1, R&D, ADV   
Sample Size: 1710 
 
Significance level = 0.050 Significance level = 0.100 
 
SIZE1 → RD SIZE1 → RD 
INST → RD INST → RD 
R&D → UD R&D → UD 
SIZE1 → UD SIZE1 → UD 
UD → ROA* UD → ROA* 
R&D → ROA* R&D → ROA* 
SIZE1 → ADV SIZE1 → ADV 
ROA* → ADV ADV → INST 
SIZE1 → DEBT1 ROA* → ADV 
DEBT1 → INST SIZE1 → DEBT1 
ROA* → DEBT1 INST → DEBT1 
   ROA* → DEBT1 
 
Variables: ROA*, SIZE1, RD, UD, INST, DEBT2, R&D, ADV   
 
Significance level = 0.050 Significance level = 0.100 
 
RD  SIZE1 SIZE1 → RD 
RD  INST INST → RD 
R&D → UD R&D → UD 
SIZE1 → UD SIZE1 → UD 
UD → ROA* UD → ROA* 
R&D → ROA* R&D → ROA* 
SIZE1 → ADV SIZE1 → ADV 
ROA* → ADV ADV → INST 
DEBT2  SIZE1 ROA* → ADV 
   DEBT2  SIZE1 
 
a Interpretation of symbols: A→B: A is a cause of B, A B: A is related with B, but the causal 
relationship is indecisive. Where, ROS* is weighted return on assets, SIZE1 is total assets, RD is related 
diversification, UD is unrelated diversification, INST is institutional investors, DEBT1 is current 
liabilities total, DEBT2 is long term debt, R&D is research and development intensity, and ADV is 
advertisement intensity.   
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Table 5.6 
DAG Result When ROS* is Useda 
 
Variables: ROS*, SIZE1, MOOH, RD, UD, INST, DEBT1, R&D, ADV  
Sample Size: 1710 
Significance level = 0.050 
 
Significance level = 0.100 
RD → MOOH RD → MOOH 
SIZE1 → RD SIZE1 → RD 
RD → INST RD → INST 
R&D → UD R&D → UD 
MOOH → UD MOOH → UD 
SIZE1 → UD SIZE1 → UD 
MOOH → R&D MOOH → R&D 
ROS* → R&D ROS* → R&D 
ADV  ROS* INST → ADV 
MOOH → DEBT1 ROS* → ADV 
SIZE1 → MOOH MOOH → DEBT1 
SIZE1 → DEBT1 SIZE1 → MOOH 
DEBT1 → INST SIZE1 → DEBT1 
ROS* → SIZE1 DEBT1 → INST 
   ROS* → SIZE1 
 
Variables: ROS*, SIZE1, MOOH, RD, UD, INST, DEBT2, R&D, ADV 
 
Significance level = 0.050 
 
Significance level = 0.100 
 
RD  → MOOH RD → MOOH 
SIZE1 → RD SIZE1 → RD 
RD → INST RD → INST 
R&D → UD R&D → UD 
MOOH → UD MOOH → UD 
SIZE1 → UD SIZE1 → UD 
MOOH → R&D MOOH → R&D 
ROS* → R&D ROS* → R&D 
ADV  ROS* INST → AD 
SIZE1 → MOOH ROS* → ADV 
ROS* → SIZE1 MOOH → DEBT2 
DEBT2   SIZE1 → MOOH 
   ROS* 
 
→ SIZE1 
a Interpretation of symbols: A→B: A is a cause of B, A  B: A is related with B, but the causal 
relationship is indecisive. Where, ROS* is weighted return on assets, SIZE1 is total assets, MOOH is 
multi-organizational ownership hierarchy, RD is related diversification, UD is unrelated diversification, 
INST is institutional investors, DEBT1 is current liabilities total, DEBT2 is long term debt, R&D is 
research and development intensity, and ADV is advertisement intensity.   
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showed more causal relationships with another variables than DEBT2. The edges and 
directions of causal flows were stable with respect to changes in the measure of debt. 
The goal of the study is to find a causal model linking accounting performance 
with size, diversification, ownership hierarchy, and other strategies. Hence, the 
comparison of the results of DAGs is focused on alternative specifications of the 
accounting performance. A summary of DAG results and model selection criteria are 
presented in Table 5.7. The first four rows in Table 5.7 are from Table 5.4. The next 
two rows in Table 5.7 are from Table 5.5.29 The suggested representations on 
accounting performance from each model are scored using Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and Schwartz criterion (SC) in Table 5.7. These scores are given in the last 
column of Table 5.7. The suggested model generating ROA* with SIZE1 has UD, 
R&D, ADV, and MOOH. The model generating ROA* with SIZE2 has R&D, and 
ADV as right hand side regressors.   
The change of the measures of debt did not change the result of DAG in terms of 
suggested model generating the accounting measures of performance. However, the 
change in the measures of size resulted in the change of suggested model generating 
ROA*. It is not surprising that the derived models with MOOH and without MOOH 
were different. The AIC and SC metrics favor the models in which MOOH was a right-
hand-side variable (-5.0721 is less than –5.0161, for example). MOOH is recognized as 
one of the key variables in deciding the structure of corporations and its role in  
                                                 
29 The DAG analyses with ROS* (Table 5.4) did not result in a specification of corporate accounting 
performance.  
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Table 5.7 
Summary of DAG Results and Model Selection Criteria, AIC and SC, from 
Regressiona 
Measures 
 
Suggested Model Goodness-of-Fit Measures 
 
AIC  
 
-5.0721 
 
W/ MOOH 
ROA*, SIZE1, DEBT1 
 
 
ROA*=f(UD, R&D, ADV, 
MOOH) SC -5.0572 
AIC -5.0721 W/ MOOH 
ROA*, SIZE1, DEBT2 
 
ROA*=f(UD, R&D, ADV, 
MOOH) SC -5.0572 
AIC -5.0393 W/ MOOH 
ROA*, SIZE2, DEBT1 
 
ROA*=f(R&D, ADV) 
SC -5.0323 
AIC -5.0393 W/ MOOH 
ROA*, SIZE2, DEBT2 
 
ROA*=f(R&D, ADV) 
SC -5.0323 
AIC -5.0161 W/O MOOH  
ROA*, SIZE1, DEBT1 
 
ROA*=f(UD, R&D) 
SC -5.0091 
AIC -5.0161 W/O MOOH  
ROA*, SIZE1, DEBT2 
 
ROA*=f(UD, R&D) 
SC -5.0091 
a ROA* is weighted return on assets, SIZE1 is total asset, SIZE2 is the number of employees, DEBT1 is 
current liabilities total, and DEBT2 is long-term debt. W/ MOOH means inclusion of MOOH in the DAG 
analysis. W/O MOOH means exclusion of MOOH in the DAG analysis. AIC is Akaike information 
criterion and SC is Schwartz criterion. Where AIC = log (e’e/n) + 2K/n and SC = LOG (e’e/n) + K log n/n 
,where n is number of observations, K is number of parameters. 
Note: AIC and SC are statistical loss functions which balance “fit” and “parsimony” in model 
specification. The goal is to select the model that minimizes the criterion. The selection criteria can be 
compared across alternative models for the same “dependent” variables. 
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generating accounting performance is significant when corporation changes its size. 
Failure to include this variable will show incorrect causal flows. 
Since the change in the measure of size, and inclusion or exclusion of MOOH 
resulted in suggesting different models representing ROA*, goodness-of-fit measures 
are applied as the criteria to decide final model. Both, Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and Schwartz criterion (SC) penalize the loss of degrees of freedom that occurs 
when a model is expanded. Both measures are improved (decreased in numeric size) as 
R2 increases, but everything else held constant, degrade as the model size increases. The 
Schwartz criterion, with its heavier penalty for degree of freedom lost, will lean toward 
a simpler model (Green, 2000). According to AIC and SC, the one from DAG using 
ROA* with MOOH and SIZE1 is the model to choose. The decision based on AIC and 
SC got support from the analyses in Tables 5.4 - 5.6.  I found that relatively there were 
more changes in the edges and directions of causal flows in different significance levels 
when SIZE2 was used than SIZE1 was used from Table 5.4. I also found that the 
models with MOOH in Table 5.4 were more stable than the models without MOOH in 
Table 5.3, when changing the measure of debt. The analyses from Tables 5.4 –5.6 imply 
that the consistency of causal graphs can be improved by including MOOH or using 
SIZE1 instead of SIZE2.  
However, result with DEBT1 and result with DEBT2 from DAGS using ROA* 
with MOOH and SIZE1 were not distinguishable, since they had the same magnitude in 
terms of AIC and SC. Comparing the result of DAG in both cases from Table 5.4, these 
two were the same with the exception of causal flows related to debt. The choice 
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between the two did not change the determination of the DAG model generating ROA*. 
Both DAGs resulted in UD, R&D, ADV, and MOOH were right-hand-side regressors to 
estimate ROA*. However, when it came to the adjustment problem30 in measuring the 
individual total effect of variables that was not included in the model generating ROA*, 
it was sensitive to the choice between the two. Rather than having debt isolated by 
choosing the DAG with DEBT2, it was appropriate to choose the DAG with DEBT1 
and measured the interaction of debt with another variables. 
Based on the decision made above, Figure 5.1 provides the suggested causal 
flows from DAG generating ROA* with MOOH. Without imposing any prior 
restrictions on causal flows, the DAG shows that the majority of corporate structure and 
strategy variables are either direct or indirect causes of corporate accounting 
performance. Further, the results generally support the structure → strategy → 
performance paradigm discussed in Chapter II. The ovals in dotted lines in Figure 5.1 
enclose measures associated with each of the above paradigm categories: structure, 
strategy, and performance. The two structure variables SIZE and MOOH have three 
arrows from strategy variables flowing in to them (RD→MOOH, ADV→SIZE, and 
R&D→ MOOH). SIZE and MOOH direct five arrows to strategy variables (SIZE→RD, 
SIZE →DEBT, SIZE→UD, MOOH→DEBT, MOOH→ UD). 
There is only one arrow from a structure variable (MOOH) to the performance variable 
(ROA*). Generally structural information finds its influence on performance by passing 
through the strategy variables. The DAG has ADV, MOOH, UD, and R&D as direct 
                                                 
30 The device designed to avoid Simpson’s Paradox (Pearl, 2000). 
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causes of accounting performance when it was measured as ROA*. The effect of RD, 
and SIZE are transferred to ROA* via the former four factors. The DAG shows that the 
effect of SIZE on ROA* flows through MOOH and UD. The variables R&D, MOOH 
and SIZE are the causes of UD. The variables RD, R&D and SIZE are the causes of 
MOOH. DEBT is indicated as the common effect of SIZE, MOOH, and ROA*, rather 
than a cause of ROA*. INST is indicated as the common effect of DEBT and RD. 
 
Results of Regression Analyses  
In this section I present results on regression models. The purpose in this section 
is to compare the DAG-suggested models based on Figure 5.1 with a Full model –where 
all variables are included as regressors in an equation for accounting performance 
(ROA*). 
The DAG showed how the nine variables under study are causally related. In 
other words, a causal model on these nine variables is the DAG presented in Figure 5.1. 
In order to measure the strength of relationship and to compare the DAG model with the 
Full model that included all the variables, regression analysis was applied. Since the 
analysis is done using longitudinal data, caution is required in order not to violate 
classical assumptions of regression. Estimation was based on the result of various 
preliminary tests. Table 5.8 shows the results of the tests. In order to check the stability 
of the estimation method chosen from tests, tests were repeated for different measures  
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Figure 5.1 
Suggested Causal Flows from the DAG with Ownership Hierarchya 
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Table 5.8 
Test for Cross-Sectional Heteroskedasticity and Cross-Sectional Correlationa 
Models 
 
Null 
Hypotheses 
Tests P Value Result of Tests 
DAG Model 
 
    
W/ MOOH 
SIZE1 
 
σi  = σ 
σij = 0 
LM=342.34 
B-P LM=17820 
 
P=0.00 
P=0.90 
Reject H0 
Don’t reject H0 
W/ MOOH 
SIZE2 
σi  = σ 
σij = 0 
LM=341.11 
B-P LM=17759 
 
P=0.00 
P=0.76 
Reject H0 
Don’t reject H0 
W/O MOOH 
 
σi  = σ 
σij = 0 
LM=288.73 
B-P LM=17847 
 
P=0.00 
P=0.71 
Reject H0 
Don’t reject H0 
Full Model 
 
    
SIZE1, DEBT1 
 
σi  = σ 
σij = 0 
LM=341.11 
B-P LM=17759 
 
P=0.00 
P=0.85 
Reject H0 
Don’t reject H0 
SIZE1, DEBT2 σi  = σ 
σij = 0 
LM=337.53 
B-P LM=17750  
 
P=0.00 
P=0.86 
Reject H0 
Don’t reject H0 
SIZE2, DEBT1 
 
σi  = σ 
σij = 0 
LM=340.17 
B-P LM=17795 
 
P=0.00 
P=0.80 
Reject H0 
Don’t reject H0 
SIZE2, DEBT2 σi  = σ 
σij = 0 
LM=336.48 
B-P LM=17792 
 
P=0.00 
P=0.80 
Reject H0 
Don’t reject H0 
a Model of each row is as follows from the top to bottom: ROA*=f(UD, R&D, ADV, MOOH), 
ROA*=f(RD,ADV), ROA*=f(UD, R&D), ROA*=f(RD,UD,R&D,ADV,MOOH,DEBT1,SIZE1,INST), 
ROA*=f(RD,UD,R&D,ADV,MOOH,DEBT2,SIZE1,INST), 
ROA*=f(RD,UD,R&D,ADV,MOOH,DEBT1,SIZE2,INST), 
ROA*=f(RD,UD,R&D,ADV,MOOH,DEBT2,SIZE2,INST). 
LM is calculated as T/2
N
i 1=
∑ ( (σii / σ2) – 1  )2  where σij = 1/T T
t 1=
∑ eit ejt  and  σ2  = 1/N N
i 1=
∑ σii and it 
has a chi-square distribution with N-1 degrees of freedom. 
B-P LM is calculated as T
N
i 2=
∑ 1
1
−
=
∑i
j
rij2  where  rij2 = σij2 / σijσjj  and it has asymptotic chi-square 
distribution with N(N-1)/2 degrees of freedom. In LM and B-P LM, N is number of cross sectional units 
and T is time period. 
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of the variables. The general model to represent the ith observation on ROA* suggested 
by Figure 5.1 is given as equation 5.1. 
 
 ROA*it = A0 + A1(MOOH)it  + A2(R&D)it + A3(UD) + A4(ADV)it + εit  (5.1) 
 
Where Ai, i = 0,1,2,3,4 are unknown parameters to be estimated and εi is a residual or 
error term. The classical assumption on εi are that εit is not correlated with εjt   for i≠j 
and other εi has a constant variance. Representing the variance of εi as σi and covariance 
of εi and εj as σij, we test for σi  = σ and σij = 0, i ≠j in the estimation of equation 5.1. 
First, one tests for the hypothesis of homoskedasticity, and second, one tests for a 
diagonal covariance matrix (that is, no cross-sectional correlation).    
Two tests were conducted to check cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and cross-
sectional correlation, respectively. Also results of estimations including a correction for 
first-order autocorrelation of residuals (AR(1)) were compared with results without the  
AR(1) correction to see if autocorrelation is a serious problem. The Lagrangian 
Multiplier (LM) test was conducted for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. The null 
hypothesis of LM test is error covariance is constant, i.e., σi = σ. In Table 5.6, the 
hypothesis was rejected in all seven models. The test result indicated that the estimation 
method should incorporate the remedy of cross-sectional heteroscedasticity. The 
Breusch-Pegan (B-P) test was conducted for cross-sectional correlation (that is, a test 
for a diagonal covariance matrix). The null hypothesis for the Breusch-Pegan test is σij 
= 0 when i ≠ j. It was not rejected in all seven models. For each model, the estimation 
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with AR(1) correction and without AR(1) were conducted and carefully compared. 
Their results didn’t show any differences. So pooled cross-section time-series 
estimation, allowing cross-sectional heteroscedasticity was adopted as the estimation 
method. The estimations of model were achieved by using SHAZAM. In order to 
measure the forecasting ability of models in the next section, the data on 1998 was 
reserved and the data from 1990 to 1997 was used in the model estimation. 
Four tables are provided for showing the result of estimation. Table 5.9 shows 
the regression result from the Full model when MOOH was not included. In order to see 
the stability of model, multiple measures of size, debt were used. For example, the 
estimation model at second column is ROA*=f(RD, UD, R&D, ADV, DEBT1, SIZE1, 
INST). The regression results were consistent across different measures in terms of sign 
and significance level. Most of coefficients are significant except the one for RD. The 
coefficients of UD, R&D, ADV are significantly different from zero at 5% significance 
level in all four cases. The coefficients of R&D and ADV have positive sign. The 
coefficient of UD has negative sign. The coefficient of SIZE is negative and 
significantly different from zero at 5% level for all cases. The coefficient of DEBT is 
negative and significantly different from zero at 5% level for two cases. The coefficient 
of INST is positive and significantly different from zero at 5% significance level for all 
four cases. Table 5.10 shows the regression result from the Full model, which has all 
variables as the causes of ROA*. In order to examine the stability of model, multiple 
measures of size, and debt were used. For example, the estimation model at second 
column is ROA*=f(RD, UD, R&D, ADV, MOOH,DEBT1, SIZE1, INST). 
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Table 5.9 
Pooled Cross-Section Time Series Allowing Cross–Sectional Heteroskedasticity for 
the Full Model without MOOHa 
Dependent 
variable =ROA* 
Full Model where ROA* = f (All w/o MOOH) 
N = 1520 SIZE1, DEBT1 SIZE1, DEBT2 SIZE2, DEBT1 SIZE2, DEBT2 
Variables     
CONSTANT .0474*** .05153*** .0877*** .0901*** 
RD -.0095 -.0094 -.0082 -.0083 
UD -.0205*** -.0212*** -.0201*** -.0209*** 
R&D .7412*** .7448*** .7345*** .7365*** 
ADV .5176*** .5140*** .5199*** .5155*** 
MOOH     
DEBT -.0028*** -.0007 -.0029*** -.0007 
SIZE -.0029* -.0035*** -.0064*** -.0066*** 
INST 
 
.0002* .0002* .0002* .0002* 
F-value 87.92*** 86.25*** 90.69*** 88.77*** 
Buse R-Square .288 .284 .295 .290 
AIC -5.0629 -5.0602 -5.0695 -5.0664 
SC -5.0385 -5.0356 -5.0449 -5.0419 
RMSE .08171 .08173 .08216 .08225 
***p<.005, ** p<.01, *p<.05. 
a This table presents the results of four estimations on ROA*. All variables are included as regressors 
except MOOH. Each column is different by the measure of size, and debt. AIC and SC are criteria of 
“goodness-of-fit”. AIC is Akaike information criterion and SC is Schwartz criterion.  AIC = log (e’e/n) + 
2K/n and SC = LOG (e’e/n) + K log n/n ,where n is number of observations, K is number of parameters. 
RMSE is measuring forecasting power. Buse R-square is calculated as 1 – e’Ω-1e / (Y-DY)’ Ω-1 (Y-DY) 
with D = jj’Ω-1/ j’Ω-1j where j is an N×1 vectors of ones, Ω is a known positive definite symmetric matrix 
that allows for a general error covariance structure. Unlike the usual R-square, the Buse R-square is not 
guaranteed to be a non-decreasing function of the number of explanatory variables. 
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Table 5.10 
Pooled Cross-Section Time Series Allowing Cross–Sectional Heteroskedasticity for 
the Full Model with MOOHa 
Dependent 
variable =ROA* 
Full Model where ROA* = f (All) 
N = 1520 SIZE1, DEBT1 SIZE1, DEBT2 SIZE2, DEBT1 SIZE2, DEBT2 
Variable     
CONSTANT .0338*** .0369*** .0759*** .0769*** 
RD -.0075 -.0073 -.0058 -.0057 
UD -.0182*** -.0186*** -.0177*** -.0182*** 
R&D .7182*** .7196*** .7269*** .7269*** 
ADV .5091*** .5058*** .5149*** .5109*** 
MOOH -.0056*** -.0058*** -.0042*** -.0045*** 
DEBT -.0025*** -.0005 -.0025*** -.0005 
SIZE .0001 -.0002 -.0043*** -.0044*** 
INST 
 
.0002* .0002* .0002* .0002* 
F-Value 80.56*** 79.35*** 81.78*** 80.43*** 
Buse R-Square .29 .29 .30 .30 
AIC -5.0682 -5.0658 -5.0726 -5.0702 
SC -5.0402 -5.0378 -5.0446 -5.0421 
RMSE .08143 .08138 .08149 .08149 
***p<.005, ** p<.01, *p<.05. 
a This table presents the results of four estimations on ROA*. All variables are included as regressors. 
Each column is different by the measure of size, and debt. AIC and SC are criteria of “goodness-of-fit”. 
AIC is Akaike information criterion and SC is Schwartz criterion.  AIC = log (e’e/n) + 2K/n and SC = 
LOG (e’e/n) + K log n/n ,where n is number of observations, K is number of parameters. 
RMSE is measuring forecasting power. Buse R-square is calculated as 1 – e’Ω-1e / (Y-DY)’ Ω-1 (Y-DY) 
with D = jj’Ω-1/ j’Ω-1j where j is an N×1 vectors of ones, Ω is a known positive definite symmetric matrix 
that allows for a general error covariance structure. Unlike the usual R-square, the Buse R-square is not 
guaranteed to be a non-decreasing function of the number of explanatory variables.  
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The regression results were consistent across different measures in terms of sign and 
significance level. Most of coefficients are significant except the one for RD. The 
coefficients of UD, R&D, ADV, and MOOH are significantly different from zero in 5% 
significance level in all four cases. The coefficients of UD and MOOH have negative 
sign and the coefficient of R&D and ADV have positive sign. The coefficient of DEBT 
is negative and significantly different from zero at 5% level in two cases. The 
coefficient of SIZE is negative and significantly different from zero at 5% level in two 
cases. The coefficient of INST is positive and significantly different from zero at 5% 
level in three cases. 
Table 5.11 shows the regression result from DAG model, which used the 
variables only if they were shown to directly cause ROA* from DAG. The derived 
model generating accounting performance based on DAG has DU, R&D, ADV, and 
MOOH as right hand side regressors. Referring back to Figure 5.1, one can see no 
“unblocked” backdoor path between one of these variables and ROA*. The derived 
model generating accounting performance based on the DAG when MOOH is not 
included has DU and R&D as right hand side regressors. In both models, the 
coefficients of the regressors are all significantly different from zero at a 5% 
significance level. DU and R&D in the DAG model without MOOH have the same 
signs as those in the MOOH included DAG models. The right hand side regressors in 
the DAG models have the same signs as those in the Full models that are presented in 
Table 5.10. In order to facilitate the comparison between the Full model and the DAG 
model, the estimated coefficients, standard errors and several criteria of model selection
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Table 5.11 
Pooled Cross-Section Time Series Allowing Cross–Sectional Heteroskedasticity for 
the DAG Modela 
Dependent 
variable =ROA* 
DAG Model with MOOH  
ROA*=f (DU,R&D,ADV,MOOH) 
DAG Model without MOOH 
ROA*=f (DU, R&D) 
N = 1520   
Variables   
CONSTANT .0460*** .0508*** 
RD   
UD -.0187*** -.0228*** 
R&D .7223*** .7558*** 
ADV .5006***  
MOOH -.0063***  
DEBT1   
SIZE1   
INST 
 
  
F-Value 155.59*** 200.24*** 
Buse R-Square .29 .21 
AIC -5.0721 -5.0161 
SC -5.0572 -5.0093 
RMSE .08137 
 
.8459 
***p<.005, ** p<.01, *p<.05. 
a This table presents the results of two models on ROA*. AIC and SC are criteria of “goodness-of-fit”. 
AIC is Akaike information criterion and SC is Schwartz criterion.  AIC = log (e’e/n) + 2K/n and SC = 
LOG (e’e/n) + K log n/n ,where n is number of observations, K is number of parameters. 
RMSE is measuring forecasting power. Buse R-square is calculated as 1 – e’Ω-1e / (Y-DY)’ Ω-1 (Y-DY) 
with D = jj’Ω-1/ j’Ω-1j where j is an N×1 vectors of ones, Ω is a known positive definite symmetric matrix 
that allows for a general error covariance structure. Unlike the usual R-square, the Buse R-square is not 
guaranteed to be a non-decreasing function of the number of explanatory variables.  
 
  84 
  
are given in usual regression format. Since the model with MOOH, ROA*, 
SIZE1, DEBT1 was chosen as the most plausible model from Table 5.7, a comparison 
is focused on the Full model with SIZE1 and DEBT1. Equation 5.2 presents the Full 
model with SIZE1 and DEBT1 in Table 5.10 and equation 5.3 presents the DAG model 
with MOOH. 
 
ROA*   =  .0338 - .0075 (RD) - .0182 (UD) + .7182 (R&D) + .5091 (ADV) 
     (.0123)  (.0062)          (.0037)           (.0427)              (.0375) 
 
- .0056 (MOOH) - .0025 (DEBT1) + .0001 (SIZE1) + .0002 (INST),   (5.2) 
   (.0014)                 (.0008)                 (.0015)                (.0001) 
 
Where F-Value=80.56, Buse R2 = .29, AIC=-5.068, SC=-5.040. 
 
ROA*  =   .046 - .0187 (UD) + .7223 (R&D) + .5006 (ADV) - .0063 (MOOH),   (5.3) 
     (.004)  (.0038)          (.0422)              (.0376)              (.0012) 
 
Where F-Value= 155.59, Buse R2 =.29, AIC=-5.072, SC=-5.057. 
   
The F-value is higher in the DAG model (equation 5.3) compared with the Full 
models (equation 5.2). The information measures, AIC and SC, both indicate that the 
DAG model is superior to the Full models. The signs and significance levels of four 
variables in the DAG model are same as the signs and significance levels of them in the 
Full model.  They are all significantly different from zero at 5% level in both models. 
The coefficients of ADV and R&D have positive signs, suggesting that in general U.S. 
large industrial corporations could generate more returns by investing on research and 
development, and advertisement in 1990s. The coefficient of UD is negative, suggesting 
that in general U.S. large industrial corporations did not benefit from expanding their 
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businesses to different industries in 1990s. The coefficient associated with MOOH is 
negative, suggesting that, in general, U.S. large industrial corporations, that expanded 
their subsidiary ownership hierarchy vertically, reduced accounting profits by doing so. 
In the equation 5.2, DEBT and INST are significantly different from zero at 5% 
level, suggesting their role in generating ROA*. However, the results of DAG suggest 
that DEBT and INST are both effect rather than a cause of ROA* and thus they should 
not be included in the model representing ROA*. Among DAG models, AIC and SC 
indicate that the DAG model with MOOH is superior to the DAG model without 
MOOH. 
Table 5.12 shows the models for RD and SIZE that are not included in the DAG 
model for generating ROA*. But they are indirectly related with ROA* and theory tells 
us that they are factors affecting accounting performance of industrial corporations. 
According to the result from the DAG, DR, SIZE have no direct effect on ROA*. They 
affect ROA* via other variables. In order to correctly measure the effect of DR to 
ROA*, and SIZE to ROA*, the adjustment problem suggested by Pearl (2000) was 
considered. This procedure allows us to define other variables that should be included to 
measure the effect of one variable to ROA*. The adjustment problem process suggested 
that the model for RD needed to include SIZE and the model for SIZE needed to 
include ADV. The estimated coefficients, standard errors, and R2 are given in usual 
regression format. In these two equations, the interpretation of coefficient should be 
focused on RD in equation 5.4, and SIZE in equation 5.5. 
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Table 5.12 
Estimation of Indirect Effect Using Adjustment Problema 
Dependent 
variable =ROA* 
DAG Models based on “adjustment problem” 
N = 1520 RD SIZE 
Variable   
CONSTANT .0940*** .0808*** 
RD -.0005  
UD   
R&D   
ADV  .5262*** 
MOOH   
DEBT1   
SIZE1 -.0031* -.0038*** 
INST 
 
  
Buse R-Square 0.01 0.11 
F-value 2.315** 83.78*** 
AIC -4.8549 -4.8970 
SC -4.8479 -4.89 
***p<.005, ** p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10 
a This table presents the results two estimations. Second column presents the result on measuring the 
effect of RD to ROA*. Third column presents the result on measuring the effect of SIZE to ROA*. AIC 
and SC are criteria of “goodness-of-fit”. AIC is Akaike information criterion and SC is Schwartz 
criterion.  AIC = log (e’e/n) + 2K/n and SC = LOG (e’e/n) + K log n/n ,where n is number of 
observations, K is number of parameters. 
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 ROA*   = .094   -    .0005 (RD)     -   .0031 (SIZE)   ; Buse R2 = .01   (5.4) 
                (.0127)    (.0071)               (.0015) 
 
The Buse R2 is low, and the coefficient of RD is negative but not significantly 
different from zero, suggesting that in general RD did not have a significant influence 
on ROA* in 1990s. The Full model with SIZE1 and DEBT1 from Table 5.10 provided 
the same interpretation on RD. 
 
ROA*  = .0808  -    .0038 (SIZE)  +   .5262 (ADV)   ; Buse R2 =.11  (5.5) 
    (.0116)     (.0013)                (.0417)  
 
The coefficient of SIZE is negative and significantly different from zero at 5% 
significance level, suggesting that in general U.S. large industrial corporations got harm 
rather than benefit on their returns from expanding their size in 1990s. This 
interpretation aligns with the one about UD from equation 5.3. It is no surprising that 
SIZE and UD have a same impact on ROA*. In the Full model with SIZE1 and DEBT1, 
the coefficient of SIZE1 is positive and not significantly from zero. This is the an 
example of making a wrong conclusion when one does not select the model 
appropriately, suggesting that researchers need to have a guidance from DAG when 
selecting the variables in the model. 
 
Forecasting Power 
Comparisons of forecasting ability of the Full models with the DAG models, 
and the DAG model with MOOH and without MOOH were studies using 1998 data. 
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The model parameters were fit on 1990-1997 data. Out-of-sample forecasts over the 
period of 1998 were made for the Full model, the DAG model with MOOH and the 
DAG model without MOOH. Based on parameter values fit over data 1990-1997 for the 
Full model, the DAG model with MOOH and the DAG model without MOOH, actual 
1998 values for the right- hand side variables were used to forecast 1998 values for 
ROA*. As criteria of “goodness”, Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) is used and the 
result of test is provided in Table 5.7 – 5.9.  Root Mean Squared Error is MSE  and 
MSE  =  
2190
1
)**(
190
1 ∑
=
∧−
i
iROAROA i . In terms of RMSE, the DAG model is superior to 
the Full models. When comparing the DAG model with MOOH with the DAG model 
without MOOH, RMSE clearly shows that the DAG model with MOOH is superior in 
forecasting.  
It may be appropriate to use a formal test for judging which model is preferred 
in terms of forecasting performance. Based on the forecast encompassing described in 
Chapter IV, test is conducted and the results of the test are presented in Table 5.13 in 
probability form. The null hypothesis (λ=0) is that the forecast of accounting 
performance from the model in the column encompasses the forecast from the model in 
the row. For example, the entry .85 in the second line is the p-value that indicates 
forecasting accounting performance from the Full model with MOOH encompassing the 
forecasts from the Full model without MOOH at 0.1 significance level. The value of λ, 
.85, was estimated as follows: The coefficients from the Full model with MOOH, that is 
estimated in period: 1990-1997, is used to forecast ROA* in 1998 and forecast error, e1t, 
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is recorded. Same forecasting procedure for 1998 is made using the Full model without 
MOOH and forecast error e2t is recorded. Then estimate the following equation: e1t = 
λ(e1t - e2t) + εt  where εt  is a white noise term as the composite forecast error. When the 
null hypothesis is true, the first forecast encompasses the second. Same procedure to 
acquire .85 are made except defining the forecast error from the Full model without 
MOOH as e1t and the forecast error from the full model with MOOH as e2t instead. 
Then the value of λ, .22, are derived. It indicates that the Full model without MOOH 
encompasses the Full model with MOOH. Based on the implication from the two λs, 
.85 and .22, finally I conclude that the Full model with MOOH and the Full model 
without MOOH perform equally in forecasting. 
For the DAG model w/o MOOH, all other three models outperform or 
encompass the DAG model w/o MOOH in forecasting. The tests between the DAG 
model w/ MOOH and the Full model w/ MOOH showed that neither of them 
encompasses the other in forecasting ROA* in 1998. The tests between the DAG model 
w/ MOOH and the Full model w/o MOOH showed that neither of them encompasses 
the other in forecasting ROA* in 1998. 
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Table 5.13 
Forecast Encompassing Testa 
 
 Full w/ MOOH Full w/o MOOH DAG w/ MOOH DAG w/o MOOH 
 
Full w/ MOOH  
 
0.22 
λ = 0 
 
 
0.20 
λ = 0 
 
 
0.00 
λ ≠ 0 
 
 
Full w/o MOOH 
 
0.85 
λ = 0 
 
 
 
0.46 
λ = 0 
 
 
0.00 
λ ≠ 0 
 
 
DAG w/ MOOH 
 
0.61 
λ = 0 
 
 
0.40 
λ = 0 
 
 
 
0.00 
λ ≠ 0 
 
 
DAG w/o MOOH 
 
0.94 
λ = 0 
 
 
0.78 
λ = 0 
 
 
0.94 
λ = 0 
 
 
a First entry in one cell is the p-value of the null hypothesis that a model (in a column) encompasses 
another model (in a row) and second entry in one cell is the followed conclusion. For example, the first 
entry in the second row is 0.85, and then full model with MOOH encompasses the full model without 
MOOH in forecasting ROA* at a 0.10 significance level. λ is estimated from the equation :  e1t = λ(e1t - 
e2t) + εt  where  eit is two forecast error series and εt  is composite forecast error.  
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Re-estimation Using Full Years 
 Finally the regressions from the Tables 5.10 – 5.12 are repeated by including 
1998 to the sample period. Tables 5.14 – 5.16 present the result of regressions. And 
they are compared with the regressions that have sample period from 1990 to 1997. In 
terms of sign, magnitude, and significance level the results from the regression covering 
1990 to 1998 are similar to the results from the regression covering 1990 to 1997. This 
is same for all three tables. 
 
Summary 
 In this chapter I presented empirical results on the causal representation of 
accounting performance in terms of structure and strategy variables from individual 
firm data over the years 1990-1998. Results from TETRADII show a DAG structure 
that supports the structure → strategy → performance paradigm, as most causal flows 
identified at alternative level of significance are consistent with this flow. Regression 
analysis, comparing a full model with the DAG model is offered as further evidence of 
the DAG-model validity. Here statistical loss functions AIC and SC, support the DAG 
specifications over the Full models. Finally out of sample forecast of 1998 data from the 
models fit over 1990-1997 data, support the DAG-based models.  
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Table 5.14 
Full Model Estimation for the Full Sample Perioda 
Dependent 
variable =ROA* 
Full Model where ROA* = f (All) 
N = 1710 SIZE1, DEBT1 SIZE1, DEBT2 SIZE2, DEBT1 SIZE2, DEBT2 
Variable     
CONSTANT .0537*** .0543*** .0915*** .0899*** 
RD -.0051 -.0047 -.0038 -.0036 
UD -.0177*** -.0181*** -.0175*** -.0178*** 
R&D .7102*** .7119*** .7129*** .7141*** 
ADV .4913*** .4881*** .4998*** .4965*** 
MOOH -.0041*** -.0044*** -.0033*** -.0037*** 
DEBT -.0021** -.0007 -.0021*** -.0007 
SIZE .0016 -.0017 -.0052*** -.0049*** 
INST 
 
.0001 .0001 .0001 .0008 
F-value 75.89*** 75.25*** 78.16*** 77.27*** 
Buse R-Square .26 .26 .27 .27 
AIC -5.0635 -5.0612 -5.0666 -5.0643 
SC -5.0381 -5.0357 -5.0412 -5.0388 
***p<.005, ** p<.01, *p<.05. 
a This table presents the results of four estimations on ROA*. All variables are included as regressors. 
Each column is different by the measure of size, and debt. AIC and SC are criteria of “goodness-of-fit”. 
AIC is Akaike information criterion and SC is Schwartz criterion.  AIC = log (e’e/n) + 2K/n and SC = 
LOG (e’e/n) + K log n/n ,where n is number of observations, K is number of parameters. 
Buse R-square is calculated as 1 – e’Ω-1e / (Y-DY)’ Ω-1 (Y-DY) with D = jj’Ω-1/ j’Ω-1j where j is an N×1 
vectors of ones, Ω is a known positive definite symmetric matrix that allows for a general error 
covariance structure. Unlike the usual R-square, the Buse R-square is not guaranteed to be a non-
decreasing function of the number of explanatory variables.  
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Table 5.15 
DAG Model Estimation for the Full Sample Perioda 
Dependent 
variable =ROA* 
DAG Model with MOOH  
ROA*=f (DU,R&D,ADV,MOOH) 
DAG Model without MOOH 
ROA*=f (DU, R&D) 
N = 1710   
Variable   
CONSTANT .0472*** .0532*** 
RD   
UD -.0186*** -.0226*** 
R&D .7093*** .7339*** 
ADV .4859***  
MOOH -.0055***  
DEBT1   
SIZE1   
INST 
 
  
F-value 141.52*** 
 
194.07*** 
Buse R-Square .26 .19 
AIC -5.0659 -5.0184 
SC -5.0532 -5.0021 
***p<.005, ** p<.01, *p<.05. 
a This table presents the results of two models on ROA*. AIC and SC are criteria of “goodness-of-fit”. 
AIC is Akaike information criterion and SC is Schwartz criterion.  AIC = log (e’e/n) + 2K/n and SC = 
LOG (e’e/n) + K log n/n ,where n is number of observations, K is number of parameters. Buse R-square is 
calculated as 1 – e’Ω-1e / (Y-DY)’ Ω-1 (Y-DY) with D = jj’Ω-1/ j’Ω-1j where j is an N×1 vectors of ones, 
Ω is a known positive definite symmetric matrix that allows for a general error covariance structure. 
Unlike the usual R-square, the Buse R-square is not guaranteed to be a non-decreasing function of the 
number of explanatory variables.  
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Table 5.16 
Indirect Effect Estimation for the Full Sample Perioda 
Dependent 
variable =ROA* 
DAG Model based on adjustment problem 
N = 1710 RD SIZE 
Variable   
CONSTANT .1064*** .0949*** 
RD -.0006  
UD   
R&D   
ADV  .5122*** 
MOOH   
DEBT1   
SIZE1 -.0044* -.0052*** 
INST 
 
  
F-value 5.516*** 77.14*** 
AIC -4.8550 -4.9001 
SC -4.8486 -4.8938 
***p<.005, ** p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10 
a This table presents the results of two estimations. Second column presents the result on measuring the 
effect of RD to ROA*. Third column presents the result on measuring the effect of SIZE to ROA*. AIC 
and SC are criteria of “goodness-of-fit”. AIC is Akaike information criterion and SC is Schwartz 
criterion.  AIC = log (e’e/n) + 2K/n and SC = LOG (e’e/n) + K log n/n ,where n is number of 
observations, K is number of parameters. Buse R-square is calculated as 1 – e’Ω-1e / (Y-DY)’ Ω-1 (Y-DY) 
with D = jj’Ω-1/ j’Ω-1j where j is an N×1 vectors of ones, Ω is a known positive definite symmetric matrix 
that allows for a general error covariance structure. Unlike the usual R-square, the Buse R-square is not 
guaranteed to be a non-decreasing function of the number of explanatory variables.  
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 This chapter integrates the results reported in Chapter V with the theory outlined 
in Chapter II. The section below briefly reviews the research objectives and discusses 
the overall findings. The following section is organized by discussion of the DAG 
results and discussion of the regression results. Directions for future study, limitation of 
the study, and concluding remarks follow. 
 
Summary of Objectives and General Discussion of Results 
The objectives of this study are to define through the directed acyclic graphs the 
causal ordering of various strategy, structure and performance variables, to construct a 
causal model of corporate performance measured as return on assets, to define the 
relationship between the effect of multi-organizational ownership hierarchy on 
corporate performance, and to investigate existing predominant theories of corporate 
performance and their support by way of empirical analysis.  
Results from the causal modeling show a DAG structure that supports the 
structure → strategy → performance paradigm, as most causal flows identified at 
alternative levels of significance are consistent with this flow. While the DAG does 
suggest feedback, as there are causal flows from strategy variables to structural 
variables, the preponderance the evidence favors the structure → strategy → 
performance causal chain. 
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Regression analysis and statistical loss functions are applied to the causal 
models suggested by the DAG results. Here again, the evidence favors the structure → 
strategy → performance model. These results are re-confirmed in tests of forecasting 
ability.  
   
Discussion of DAG Results 
Based on prior literature, I identified nine variables and classified each with 
respect to its role as a structure, strategy, or performance metric. The performance 
measure I focused on was relative return on assets (ROA*). Structural variables were 
identified as firm size (SIZE) as measured by total assets and multi-organizational 
ownership hierarchy (MOOH) as measured by levels of ownership in forms of 
subsidiary. There are six variables identified as strategy variables. They are related 
diversification (RD) and unrelated diversification (UD) measure by an entropy measure 
based on SIC codes, ownership concentration by institutional investors (INST), 
corporate debt (DEBT) measured by current liabilities total, and R&D intensity (R&D) 
and advertising intensity (ADV) measured by expenses.  
Figure 5.1 provides the suggested causal flows from the DAG analysis 
generating ROA* with MOOH. Without imposing any prior restrictions on causal 
flows, the DAG shows that the majority of corporate structure and strategies are either 
direct or indirect causes of corporate accounting performance. Further the results 
generally support the structure → strategy → performance paradigm discussed in 
Chapter II. The DAG has ADV, MOOH, UD, and R&D as direct causes of accounting 
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performance when it was measured as ROA*. The effect of RD, and SIZE are 
transferred to ROA* via the former four factors. The DAG shows that the effect of 
SIZE on ROA* flows through MOOH and UD. The variables R&D, MOOH and SIZE 
are the causes of UD. The variables RD, R&D and SIZE are the causes of MOOH. The 
variable DEBT is indicated as the common effect of SIZE, MOOH, and ROA*, rather 
than a cause of ROA*. INST is indicated as the common effect of DEBT and RD. 
Multi-organization ownership hierarchy (MOOH) is identified as a direct cause of 
ROA* and also as a mediator to transfer the effects from SIZE, RD, and R&D to 
ROA*.  
 
Comparison of the DAG Model with the Full Model 
I used regression analysis to contrast the model suggested by the DAG analysis 
with a full model of the variable, relative returns on assets (ROA*). The result of the 
regression of the Full model (Table 5.8) suggested that ownership concentration by 
institutional investors (INST) and financial pressure from debt (DEBT) played an 
important role in representing the accounting performance (ROA*) of U.S. large 
industrial corporations. Meanwhile the result of DAG analysis (Figure 5.1) suggests that 
INST and DEBT are effects rather than causes of corporate accounting performance. In 
terms of the DAG model, the variable DEBT is an ancestor rather than a descendant of 
ROA*, suggesting that DEBT should not be included in a model to represent ROA*. To 
include DEBT in the model results in suggesting that DEBT has a negative effect on 
ROA*, perhaps not supporting the agency theory, which proposes that debt burden acts 
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in such a way to improve corporate performance by putting the pressure on top 
managers. The  inclusion of DEBT in the model reduced lowered the ability of the 
model forecasting ROA*. Including INST in the Full model along with DEBT resulted 
in a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that INST affects ROA* in the 
positive way, (supporting the agency theory). This is one of the example that researcher 
can get a wrong implication from the analysis without guidance from DAG.  
 The SIZE from the Full model has positive sign and insignificant. Meanwhile 
the estimation of effect from SIZE to ROA* at the DAG model using the “adjustment 
problem” has negative sign and significant. An implication from the DAG model about 
SIZE  is that in general, most of U.S. large manufacturing, industrial corporations 
reached the optimal level of size before the period of 1990-1997 and any attempt to 
make them any bigger was harmful in 1990-1997.  
Comparison of the DAG model with the Full model was conducted using 
goodness-of –fit measures (AIC, SC). These two measures consistently suggested that 
the DAG model does fit better to the data than the Full model, even though the Full 
model has more regressors. Out-of-sample forecasts over the period of 1998 were made 
for both models and compared. The criteria of goodness (RMSE) indicated that the 
DAG model performs better than the Full model in forecasting.  
Repeating the estimation for full years including 1998 tested the stability of the 
DAG model. In terms of signs, magnitudes, and significance levels the results from the 
regression covering 1990 to 1998 were similar to the results from the regression 
covering 1990 to 1997. This suggests that the model generated from the DAG analysis 
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is relatively stable in different time periods (though it was not conducted over non-
overlapping data). 
 
Direct and Indirect Causes of Corporate Performance 
The application of DAG in the study concluded that research and development 
intensity (R&D), advertising intensity (ADV), unrelated diversification (UD), and 
ownership hierarchy structure (MOOH) are directed causes of corporate accounting 
performance (ROA*). It is further concluded that indirect causes of corporate 
accounting performance are corporate size (SIZE) and related diversification (RD). 
Following regression analysis it is demonstrated that R&D and ADV affect ROA* 
positively, and UD and MOOH affect ROA* negatively. The effect from SIZE on 
ROA* is negative. The effect of RD on ROA* is negative but not significant. 
The positive influence from R&D and ADV on ROA* has been identified in 
several studies (Ravenscraft, 1983; Scherer, 1980; and Shepherd, 1972). Jones (1995) 
supports that ADV in a positive influence on ROA*. It supports the idea of how firms 
generate rents based on the transaction cost economics. Based on the result of the study, 
I conclude that R&D and advertisement played an important role in accumulating firm 
specific assets in U.S. large manufacturing firms in 1990s. This helped them generate 
large accounting profits. 
According to a traditional strategic management perspective, unrelated 
diversification is beneficial to firms in terms of risk pooling, reduced probability of 
bankruptcy, and economies of internal capital markets (Perry, 1998; Hill & Hoskisson, 
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1987). Meanwhile unrelated diversification can be motivated by managerial efforts to 
make personal gains, which may result in the firm deviating from maximizing the value 
of its assets (an agency theory perspective). Further, the preference of managers may 
prevail if the internal governance mechanism fails. The measure of the internal 
governance mechanism used in this study is institutional investors (INST), the external 
governance mechanism is measured as financial pressure from debt (DEBT). The two 
variables do not show up as direct causes of ROA*. I interpret this as an indication that 
INST and DEBT failed to monitor the managers in 1990s as internal and external 
control mechanism. The negative effect of UD on ROA* from the regression analysis 
support the idea from agency theory that governance mechanism failure will lead 
managers to pursue their own goals. It also provides an explanation of why several large 
firm in U.S. failed while pursuing unrelated expansion in late 1990s.  
This study suggests that expansion of multi-organizational ownership hierarchy 
(MOOH) is not beneficial in terms of accounting performance. As MOOH becomes 
deeper, the control of corporate capital structure becomes more difficult. When control 
of capital structure passes through increasing levels of hierarchy, the risk of loss of 
control increases. Meanwhile, if an ultimate parent company makes its multi-
organization ownership hierarchy deeper, it can generate more free capital that would 
otherwise be used in acquiring the holdings. Accordingly, there may be an optimal level 
of MOOH for each industry or for each corporation. The result of regression analysis 
indicates that on average large U.S. industrial and manufacturing corporations have 
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already reached optimal level of MOOH. Further increase in levels of MOOH hurt  
rather than helps their accounting performance. 
 
Hypotheses and Supported Theories  
The hypotheses of R&D, ADV, MOOH, and SIZE on the relationship with 
ROA* are supported by this study. The hypotheses of UD, RD, DEBT, and INST on 
relationship with ROA* are not supported by this study.  In Chapter II, I proposed nine 
hypotheses in order to define the relationships among variables. 
Size is hypothesized that it does not have a direct effect on corporate 
performance; rather size has either an indirect effect or a mediator effect on 
performance. From the DAG analysis, size shows its role as an indirect cause and as a 
mediator.  Multi-organization ownership hierarchy is hypothesized that the proliferation 
of the ownership hierarchy is directly related to performance, because as the hierarchy 
is extended the executive officer loses control over lower level. Thus I expect MOOH to 
reduce accounting performance. DAG analysis and regression analysis indicate that 
MOOH affects ROA* negatively. 
I hypothesized that unrelated diversification and related diversification have 
both direct effect, and indirect effect via debt and institutional investors on corporate 
accounting performance. Only UD is indicated as a direct cause of ROA*, affecting it 
negatively. Several previous studies have attempted to compare the performance 
between related diversifier with unrelated diversifier. They often conclude that related 
diversifier performed better than unrelated diversifier. In this study these two ratios 
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were derived from one corporation in order to catch each strategy’s effect on one firm’s 
performance. The results of the DAG analysis in my study are consistent, as it implies 
U.S. large industrial corporations did not capture benefits from economies of scale, 
economies of scope, and vertical economies over the 1990’s: SIZE affects ROA* 
negatively, MOOH affects ROA* negatively, UD affects ROA* negatively. The DAG 
analysis shows a difference between RD and UD. RD has no effect on performance and 
UD has negative effect on performance. 
It is hypothesized in Chapter II that corporations with a high ownership 
concentration by institutional investors will outperform corporations with lower 
ownership concentration . The DAG results INST is not a cause of ROA*. Quite to the  
contrary, variable INST is affected by ROA* through DEBT (corporations showing 
good accounting performance appear to be able to attract more institutional investors). 
It is hypothesized that financial pressure from high debt level results in high 
return on assets based on agency theory. The result from DAG and the associated 
regression analysis indicates that ROA* affects Debt negatively. This result aligns with 
the proposition that the management of firms desire flexibility and freedom from 
excessive restrictions often associated with debt covenants (Barton & Gordon, 1987; 
1988). A corporation with a high earnings rate (ROA*) will maintain relatively low debt 
levels, perhaps because of its ability to finance itself from internally generated funds. 
It is possible that research conducted in a different economic period may reverse 
the finding with respect to institutional investors and debt, and their support in agency 
theory. I expect monitoring effects on managers of debt and institutional investors to be 
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stronger in a period of recession. However, during the period of continuous economic 
growth of the last seven years of 1990s, I expect monitoring of managers as agents of 
owners to be weaker than in a period of declining returns. 
In this study, debt was measured by total current liability rather than long- term 
debt, since I posited that managers would get more pressure of bankruptcy from the 
change in total current liability than the change in long-term debt. Then it is reasonable 
to see that ROA* (corporate return) is associated with DEBT (total current liability 
total) in a way that increase of ROA* reduces DEBT.  
 I hypothesized that R&D intensity increases corporate profitability (accounting 
performance). The DAG and regression results show that R&D is a direct cause of 
ROA*, affecting it positively (Ravenscraft, 1983; Scherer, 1980; and Shepherd, 1972).  
Finally, I hypothesized that advertising intensity will increase corporate 
profitability. The DAG and regression results show that ADV is a direct cause of 
ROA*,  affecting it positively (Ravenscraft, 1983; Scherer, 1980; and Shepherd, 1972).  
 Other causal flows have been uncovered and deserve out attention as well. To 
facilitate discussions, I use the arrow (→) and a (+) or (−) sign to indicate the directions 
and sign associated with the causal effect.  
SIZE (+)→ MOOH: Some theorists posit size as the major predictor of certain 
structural configurations (Pugh et al, 1969; Blau, 1970). Increase size may strain the 
managerial span of control, resulting in increased hierarchical levels and increasingly 
decentralized authority (Blau, 1970).  
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SIZE (+)→ RD, SIZE (+)→ UD: Size is correlated with both diversification 
strategy and structure in a way that it mediates strategy and structure (Grinyer & Yasai-
Ardekani, 1981). Keats and Hitt (1988) include size as the mediator between the 
strategy and structure in their causal model on corporate performance. They view size 
having an indirect effect on performance via diversification and structure. 
R&D (-)→ MOOH: I expect negative relationship between R&D and MOOH, 
because MOOH is a functional substitute for R&D. When corporations are growing 
rapidly, they are more likely to purchase than develop products and processes. The cost 
of purchasing a product line is less than developing their own product lines. 
ADV (+)→ SIZE: Both transaction cost economist (Williamson, 1975; 1979) 
and advertising analyst (Jones, 1990; 1995; 1997) maintain advertisement helps firms to 
generate more returns. It is plausible that a firm experiencing higher returns from the 
investment on advertisement will be larger (in the study, corporate size is measured by 
total assets). 
 R&D (-)→UD: There appears to be a negative relationship between 
diversification and R&D intensity (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989; Hoskisson & Hitt, 
1988). They viewed that diversified firms have control system that may lead managers 
in lower level to reduce long-term expenditures such as R&D. 
RD (+)→INST: Previous studies found that related diversifiers performed better 
that unrelated diversifiers (Palepu, 1985; Rumelt, 1986; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 
1987). Further expansion of firm to related area with its core business would attract 
more institutional investors to invest.  
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 SIZE (+)→ DEBT: The capital structure of firms varies with firm size (Bhaduri, 
2002). Large firms tend to be more diversified (that is, SIZE is positively related with 
UD and RD) and hence, less liable to financial distress. The cost associated with 
financial distress decreases with firm size (Ang, Chua, & McConnell, 1982; Warner, 
1977). Accordingly, one would expect large firms to be more leveraged.  
 
Limitation of the Study and Directions for Future Study  
 The application of the directed graph algorithm in observational data made the 
assumption that the data set is a causally sufficient set of variables (that there are no 
omitted causes for any two or more of the variables in the study). Though I have studied 
more variables than previous studies, it may be that I have not studied a causal 
sufficient set of variables. Thus, caution is needed in application. 
 In order to analyze dynamic causal flows, it will be necessary to treat the same 
variable in different years as different variables. I did not offer such a model, but 
suggest that such work is worthy of study. 
 The partial overlap of the data period weakened the reliability of the test of the 
stability of the model. In order to have a formal test to check the stability of the model, 
it is suggested to use a new data set covering new period rather than using partially 
overlapping data.       
 Finally, there is a measurement issue on hierarchy structure (vertical financial 
ownership). Inclusion of a measure of horizontal as well as vertical expansion of 
ownership hierarchy may improve future work in this area.  
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Concluding Remarks  
 Results from causal modeling using directed acyclic graphs supports the 
structure → strategy → performance paradigm as predominant relational model. This 
model can help researchers who study manager’s strategic decisions and offer 
professional advice to corporate managers. As theorists, Chamberlain (1968), 
Hammond (1990), and Pitt (1980) suggested that corporate structure leads strategy. 
Critical knowledge and decision making capabilities in large firms are dispersed 
throughout the firm rather than concentrated in top mangers. A firm’s structure 
determines how lower-level decision makers come together to contribute their 
information to corporate strategic decisions from top manager. Accordingly an analysis 
of corporate structure is required in order to analyze how corporate strategic decisions 
are made and thus how they influence corporate performance. A consultant might offer 
informed suggestions on based on a prior suggestions of corporate organizational 
structure. That is to say, by way of DAG identified here, he/she should study a firm’s 
structure in order to make informed decisions on the firm’s strategies. 
The study shows that most corporate strategies and characteristics that have 
been the focus of the research in corporate management are either direct or indirect 
causes of corporate accounting performance. Here I introduced the directed graph 
algorithm to study causality in the field of corporate management. Using several 
statistical criteria, I showed that the DAG model outperformed the Full model in fitting 
the data and forecasting. I illustrated several cases where researcher may obtain biased 
results without the aid of the DAG. A new variable, capturing corporate governance 
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structure, multi-organizational ownership hierarchy, is defined and measured. I show 
that it is one of the direct causes of corporate profitability, along with unrelated 
diversification, investment on R&D, and investment on advertisement.  
My study suggests that, in general good corporate performance in 1990s defined 
as net returns on assets, was mainly achieved by internal expansion through investment 
in R&D and advertisement, rather than external expansion of firms through unrelated 
diversification, related diversification, and expansion in multi-organizational ownership 
hierarchy. My study shows that investment in R&D and investment in advertisement 
both lead to better performance in terms of ROA. Further, my study shows that 
investment in advertisement leads to additional external expansion such as multi-
organizational ownership hierarchy and unrelated diversification, and higher debt level. 
In contrast, my study shows that investment in R&D leads less external expansion 
through multi-organizational ownership hierarchy and unrelated diversification, and 
thus leads to lower debt level. High debt and aggressive external expansion are believed 
to be primary reasons of many of the largest corporate failures in the last few years. 
Corporate regulators may control the higher risk of corporate failure coming from debt 
and external expansion by devising mechanisms that encourage more internal 
innovation such as R&D and discourage more expansion by way of additional 
advertisement. 
The result from a DAG analysis comes with certain assumptions that one must 
keep in mind. Causal paths identified in this study (Figure 5.1) may vanish if other 
variables are added to my (assumed) causally sufficient set. This conclusion puts us on 
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weak ground with respect to edges that remain. However, the decisions on removed 
edges remain unchanged if we add other variables to our causally sufficient set. Yet, I 
am confident that this trial of finding casual relations among corporate performance, 
strategy, and structure variables is beneficial to the study in corporate management. 
This study provides a guide on how we can enhance our analyses of corporate 
performance. After all, A modeling exercise is an effort to simplify the world, which we 
want to analyze, without breaking its core nature. This study provides evidence on 
relationships among a set of variables which have been the focus of theoretical and 
empirical research on corporate performance. Observations on the variables were non-
experimental. Thus, a prior rejection of a given set of variables or the prior assignment 
of causal flow may inappropriately mask the underlying causal flows that are present in 
the data. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
U.S. ULTIMATE PARENT COMPANIES USED IN THE STUDY 
         (n = 190) 
ID Name Industry SIC 
1 General Motors M6 3711 
3 Exxon Mobil P1 1311 
4 Ford Motor M6 3711 
5 General Electric E1 3641 
8 AT&T T1 4813 
9 Philip Morris T4 2111 
10 Boeing A2 3721 
12 SBC Communications T1 4813 
13 Hewlett-Packard C5 3571 
14 Kroger F1 5411 
20 Compaq Computer C5 3571 
23 Procter & Gamble S5 2841 
28 Texaco P1 1311 
33 Bell Atlantic T1 4813 
34 Merck P2 2834 
35 Chevron P1 1311 
37 Motorola N1 3674 
39 Intel S4 3674 
42 E.I. du Pont de Nemours C1 2819 
43 Johnson & Johnson P2 2844 
45 Time Warner E4 7812 
52 Lockheed Martin A2 3761 
55 GTE T1 4813 
56 Dell Computer C5 3571 
57 United Technologies A2 3724 
58 BellSouth T1 4813 
61 International Paper F4 2621 
66 Walt Disney E4 7812 
76 PepsiCo B1 2086 
77 AMR A3 4512 
79 Sara Lee C7 2251 
82 Raytheon A2 3663 
83 Coca-Cola B1 2086 
84 Microsoft C6 7372 
85 Caterpillar I1 3531 
87 Xerox C5 3861 
89 Dow Chemical C1 2821 
94 UAL A3 4512 
103 TRW M6 3714 
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U.S. ULTIMATE PARENT COMPANIES USED IN THE STUDY  
 
ID Name Industry SIC 
106 Alcoa M4 3353 
107 Pfizer P2 2834 
108 Johnson Controls M6 3822 
115 Halliburton E3 1629 
116 Delta Air Lines A3 4512 
118 Coca-Cola Enterprises B1 2086 
121 Emerson Electric E1 3824 
123 Winn-Dixie Stores F1 5411 
124 Eastman Kodak S2 3861 
126 Phillips Petroleum P1 2911 
129 American Home Products P2 2834 
131 Dana M6 3714 
134 US West T1 4813 
135 Abbott Laboratories P2 2834 
136 Atlantic Richfield P1 2911 
138 Kimberly-Clark F4 2676 
139 Warner-Lambert P2 2834 
140 Goodyear Tire & Rubber R2 3011 
143 Lear M6 3714 
145 Weyerhaeuser F4 2621 
146 Cisco Systems N1 3577 
149 Deere I1 3523 
150 Sun Microsystems C5 3571 
151 Anheuser-Busch B1 2081 
152 Gap S6 5651 
154 Textron A2 3721 
161 Farmland Industries F2 2013 
164 Whirlpool E1 3634 
166 Office Depot S6 5943 
167 Monsanto F2 2824 
170 Eli Lilly P2 2834 
172 Gillette M3 3421 
174 Manpower T2 7363 
180 Texas Instruments S4 3674 
181 Illinois Tool Works M3 3565 
183 H.J. Heinz C7 2033 
185 Schering-Plough P2 2834 
187 Colgate-Palmolive S5 2844 
189 Paccar M6 3713 
190 Northrop Grumman A2 3721 
191 General Dynamics A2 3731 
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U.S. ULTIMATE PARENT COMPANIES USED IN THE STUDY  
 
ID Name Industry SIC 
192 Staples S6 5943 
196 TJX S6 5651 
203 Gateway C5 3571 
207 Bestfoods F2 2034 
208 US Airways Group A3 4512 
210 Ingersoll-Rand I1 3562 
211 Sunoco P1 2911 
213 Eaton E1 3625 
214 Solectron S4 3672 
227 PPG Industries C1 2851 
228 Crown Cork & Seal M3 3411 
235 Occidental Petroleum M5 1311 
236 Unisys C3 3571 
237 CBS E4 4833 
242 American Standard I1 3585 
243 Baxter International M2 5047 
244 Pharmacia & Upjohn P2 2834 
245 Ashland C1 2911 
246 Fort James F4 2676 
250 Kellogg C7 2043 
252 Boise Cascade F4 5112 
256 Seagate Technology C4 3572 
260 EMC C4 3572 
261 SCI Systems S4 3672 
262 Cummins Engine I1 3519 
264 Federal-Mogul M6 3714 
269 Campbell Soup C7 2032 
271 Newell Rubbermaid M3 3951 
275 Masco M3 3432 
279 General Mills C7 2043 
283 NCR C5 3571 
285 Apple Computer C5 3571 
292 Union Carbide C1 2821 
293 Owens-Illinois B2 3221 
294 3Com N1 3577 
295 ServiceMaster D2 8741 
297 VF A4 2325 
298 Automatic Data Processing C3 8721 
300 B.F. Goodrich A2 2821 
305 Mattel T5 3942 
308 Cendant D2 7299 
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U.S. ULTIMATE PARENT COMPANIES USED IN THE STUDY  
 
ID Name Industry SIC 
309 Ryder System T7 7513 
310 Rohm & Haas C1 2821 
312 Avon Products S5 2844 
321 Fortune Brands M3 3432 
322 Dole Food C7 2033 
324 Air Products & Chemicals C1 2813 
326 Sherwin-Williams C1 5231 
330 Quantum C4 3572 
333 Litton Industries E1 3812 
334 Corning N1 3827 
335 Reynolds Metals M4 3334 
336 InaCom W3 5045 
337 America Online C3 7375 
339 Southwest Airlines A3 4512 
341 Quaker Oats C7 2043 
342 Ralston Purina C7 2047 
346 Venator S6 5661 
347 Praxair C1 2813 
349 PPL U1 4911 
354 Pitney Bowes C5 3579 
356 Black & Decker I1 3634 
361 Meritor Automotive M6 5013 
363 Dover I1 3559 
365 Engelhard C1 3399 
368 Maytag E1 3633 
369 Thermo Electron S2 3826 
372 AK Steel Holding M4 3312 
373 Brunswick T6 3732 
375 Flowers Industries C7 2051 
376 Hasbro T5 3944 
381 Medtronic M2 3845 
382 Tandy W3 5731 
383 Nash Finch W4 5141 
384 LTV M4 3312 
385 AutoZone S6 5531 
386 FMC C1 3533 
399 Clorox S5 2842 
400 Adams Resources & Energy E2 5172 
401 McGraw-Hill P4 2721 
403 Hershey Foods C7 2066 
406 Este Lauder S5 2844 
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U.S. ULTIMATE PARENT COMPANIES USED IN THE STUDY  
 
ID Name Industry SIC 
407 Foster Wheeler E3 1629 
408 Cablevision Systems T1 4841 
409 Qualcomm N1 3663 
412 Bethlehem Steel M4 3312 
418 Cooper Industries E1 3646 
421 Kaufman & Broad Home E3 1531 
422 Autoliv M6 3714 
423 Mead F4 5111 
426 Leggett & Platt F5 2515 
427 Harris A2 3812 
429 Avery Dennison C1 2672 
430 Micron Technology S4 3674 
435 Longs Drug Stores F1 5912 
437 USG B2 3275 
438 Ball M3 3411 
441 U.S. Industries M3 3432 
442 Fleetwood Enterprises M6 3716 
444 Allegheny Technologies M4 3312 
451 Becton Dickinson M2 3841 
463 Amgen P2 2834 
472 Hercules C1 2869 
474 Knight-Ridder P4 2711 
476 Tribune P4 2711 
478 Danaher M3 3423 
482 Ace Hardware W2 5072 
485 Interim Services T2 7363 
493 Phelps Dodge M4 3331 
494 Arvin Industries M6 3714 
Note:  The column “ID” is from the ranks in 1999 based on the revenue. The column “Industry” is 
based on the industry category from Fortune 500. 
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